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NEW JERSEY’S MODEL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING:
THE HOME OWNERSHIP SECURITY ACT OF 2002
By Baher Azmy and David Reiss 
INTRODUCTION
Home ownership in America comprises an elemental part of the 
metaphorical American dream, conferring social status, financial security 
and stronger community ties to its beneficiaries.1  These benefits have 
been extended to a growing proportion of Americans in recent years, 
including minority and lower-income persons who have traditionally 
been excluded from access to the credit opportunities necessary to either 
purchase homes or collateralize their home equity into valuable liquid 
assets.2  Over the past decade, a wave of new mortgage products –
including loans to “subprime” borrowers – and a host of new providers –
including mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers and finance companies –
has simultaneously emerged to service this growing market sector.3
Some of those new providers, however, have become known for 
their unscrupulous business practices.  Known as “predatory lenders,” 
they prey on vulnerable and financially unsophisticated persons, trapping 
thousands into exploitative loans that are as equally profitable for lenders 
as they are destructive for borrowers.4 Each year, predatory lending has 
sucked many billions of dollars out of the home equity and from the 
income of many Americans,5 and has resulted in a rash of devastating 
residential home foreclosures throughout the nation.  Notably, predatory 
lending has also been found in high concentrations in New Jersey.6
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., University of 
Pennsylvania; J.D., New York University School of Law.
** Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Williams College; J.D., New 
York University School of Law.
1 See KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF 
THE UNITED STATES (1987).
2 According to a recent study by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 40 percent of new homeowners since 1994 are minorities, even though 
they account for just 24 percent of the U.S. population and that African American and 
Hispanic homeownership rates have been growing at twice that of white homeowners.  
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and 
Research, Issue Brief No.  3 (December 2000); see also JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING 
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 15 (June 16, 
2003), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/.
3 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
4 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
5 ERIC STEIN ET AL., QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY 
LENDING 2 (2001) (revised October 30, 2001) [hereinafter COST OF PREDATORY 
LENDING] (estimating that several categories of abusive lending practices cost 
American homeowners $9.1 billion annually).
6 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
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Federal mortgage regulations and state law fraud protections have not 
sufficiently deterred predatory home lending practices in New Jersey.  
Indeed, even defining a core concept of “predatory lending” has eluded 
regulators7 and scholars8 because like, for example, the doctrine of 
unconscionability, its manifestations are generally context-specific.9
New Jersey, by passing the Home Ownership Security Act in 
2002 (“HOSA” or “the Act”),10 became one of a handful of leading 
states to comprehensively respond to the problem of predatory lending 
within its borders. 11  The New Jersey legislature did not choose to 
specifically define “predatory lending” nor to simply leave a definition 
of the prohibited practice sufficiently broad and ambiguous so that 
common law courts could adjudicate its parameters on a case-by- case 
basis.  Rather, following the lead of other states and a framework set up 
by the federal Home Ownership Equity Protection Act,12 New Jersey 
designated certain practices abusive where they have little or no market 
justification when made in connection with already expensive residential 
7 See Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Predatory 
Lending Practices: Staff Analysis of Regulators’ Responses (August 23, 2000)
(recommending that no additional regulations of “predatory lending” should be 
undertaken because no adequate definition exists to describe the practice); See also
Departments of the Treasury and Housing and Urban Development, Curbing Predatory 
Home Mortgage Lending 27 (June 20, 2000) [hereinafter Joint HUD-Treasury Report] 
(declining to establish specific definition of “predatory lending” but identifying core 
predatory lending practices that should be subject to regulation), available at: 
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/tresrpt.pdf. 
8 See, e.g. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course, Predatory Lending, 
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 
511-13 (2002) (surveying variety of definitions proposed by scholars and regulators).  
Professors Cathy C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy also demur from offering a precise 
definition of predatory lending, choosing instead to classify certain lending practices as 
unfair through framework of law economics.  Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. 
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002).  They suggest that predatory behavior includes loans that: (i) 
are structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (ii) engage 
in rent seeking; (iii) involve fraud or deceptive practices; (iv) lack transparency; (v) 
require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.  Id. at 1260. 
9 Relying in part on a definition adopted by the New Jersey Appellate Division, 
Associates Home Equity Serv., Inc. v. Troup, 343 N.J. Super. 254, 267-8 (App. Div. 
2001), the authors would define predatory lending as a set of practices, engaged in by 
lenders, mortgage brokers and home improvement contractors, usually through 
aggressive or deceptive sales tactics, that are so disadvantageous or abusive that the 
borrower is subjected to an unreasonable risk of default and foreclosure.
10 2003 N.J. SESS. LAW SERV. CH. 64 (West), codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. 
46:10B-22 (West 2003)
11 See 2003 ARK. ACTS §2598 (2003); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970-4979.7 (2003); 
Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE. ANN. §7-6A-1-13; High Risk Home Loan Act, 2003 ILL. 
LAWS S.B. §1784; High Cost Mortgage Loan Provisions, MASS REGS. CODE TIT. 209 § 
32-32 (2003); 2003 N.M. LAWS CH. 436; 2001 N.Y. LAWS §11856; Restrictions and 
Limitations on on High Cost Home Loans, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1e (2003); High 
Cost and Consumer Home Loans Act, 2003 S.C. ACTS § 438.  
12 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2002).
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mortgage loans and where they cause an unreasonable risk of 
foreclosure.13
The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act fills an important 
regulatory gap left open by current federal and state law.  By attempting 
to proscribe certain unjustifiable practices in connection with high-cost, 
high-risk loans, the Act goes a long way toward accomplishing its goals 
of simultaneously protecting home ownership and keeping an ample 
supply of credit available at reasonable terms for all borrowers, including 
subprime borrowers.14
In this article, we will first describe the background of the 
emerging predatory lending problem by locating the practice in the 
broader subprime mortgage lending market; identifying the emergence of 
loan terms and practices the New Jersey legislature concluded were 
abusive; and documenting the prevalence and consequences of the 
predatory lending problem in New Jersey and particularly within its low 
income and minority communities.  In Part II of the article, we will 
provide a detailed analysis of the Act’s provisions, demonstrating 
specifically how it is designed to remedy the problem and highlighting 
some of its relative strengths and weaknesses.  In Part III we will 
consider some questions left open by the Act, including whether the Act 
could be even more aggressive; whether it will hurt the broader subprime 
lending market and the low-income and minority borrowers who often 
depend on it; and whether its controversial provisions assigning liability 
for Act violations to secondary purchasers of mortgage notes will have a 
significant impact on the availability of loans for New Jersey residents.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY
A. Explosion Of The Subprime Lending Market
Predatory lending is a distinct and dangerous subset of the 
generally positive emergence of subprime lending in the residential 
mortgage market.  A subprime loan is generally intended to extend credit 
to a borrower who, for reasons such as a poor credit record, high debt-to-
income ratio, or unstable employment history, cannot qualify for a 
conventional or prime mortgage loan.15  Because of the higher costs 
associated with subprime borrowers’ ostensibly greater risk of default, 
delinquency and foreclosure, subprime loans carry higher interest rates
than conventional loans.16  Studies have estimated that subprime loans 
have on average a 2.5 to 4 percentage points higher interest rate than 
prime loans.17  Subprime lenders also typically charge higher points and 
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25-26.  
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-23(2)(b) and (c).
15 See JOHN C. WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING 
MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 29 (1997).
16 Joint HUD-Treasury Report at 27-28.  
17 Id. at 30.  See also Cathy L. Mansfield, The Road to Subprime ‘HEL’ Was 
Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime 
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fees –  charges assessed at the outset of the loan and paid either in cash or 
financed into the overall loan proceeds – to compensate for higher 
origination and servicing costs subprime loans are generally believed to 
carry.18  Notwithstanding these increased costs, subprime lending is 
generally considered to be an extremely positive development, allowing 
those traditionally excluded from conventional mortgage borrowing to 
access credit for home purchases19 or to access the equity in their homes 
for other uses.20
The subprime lending industry, once virtually nonexistent, has 
experienced tremendous growth in the past decade.  In 1993, only $35 
billion in nationwide loans were subprime, accounting for only 3% of 
overall mortgage loan originations; by 1998, subprime lending totaled 
$160 billion and its share of overall mortgage originations ballooned to 
15%.21  Subprime lending has continued its dramatic expansion, 
originating $200 billion in mortgages in 2002 across the country.22  New 
Jersey has witnessed proportional growth.  Between 1993 and 2000, the 
number of subprime loans increased in New Jersey from 2,693 to 25,403 
and the percentage share of subprime lending in the overall New Jersey 
mortgage market increased from 1% to 14%.23  The causes of this 
growth are complex and multifaceted.  They include the substantial 
Home Equity Loan Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 533 (2000) (describing her study of 
cross section of subprime loans originated between 1996-1999 which averaged 2.2 to 
4.06 higher interest rate than prime loans in a comparable period).  Within the subprime 
market, there are grades assigned from A-, B, C, D to represent progressively higher 
credit risks and which are assigned correspondingly higher interest rates.  See
WEICHER, supra note __ at 17 (reporting that subprime loans between the period 1996-
1999 were on average 3 percentage points higher than prime loans, but that large 
variations, between 2 to 6 percent existed among grades of subprime loans).  
18 WEICHER, supra note __ at 67, 69 (describing higher origination costs and 
higher servicing costs associated with increased rates of delinquency and foreclosure). 
Delinquency and foreclosure rates are much closer, when A- subprime borrowers are 
compared to prime borrowers. Id. at 35.  As discussed in detail below, however, it is 
remains unclear whether subprime loans accurately reflect an inherent market risk of 
default associated with their borrowers or whether overly-costly subprime rates and 
points and fees actually push borrowers unnecessarily over the brink of default or 
foreclosure.  See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
19 Ken Zimmerman, Director of New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, Speech 
at the Seton Hall Law School Predatory Lending Conference (June 17, 2003).
20 See Glenn B. Canner, et al. Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 
FED. RES. BULL. 241 (April 1998) (describing some of the benefits of home equity 
lending to consumers), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1998/199804lead.pdf.
21 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 50.
22 Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risks of Premature State 
Regulation of Predatory Lending, available at: 
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/00007106megriyjcceyllhml/PredReport20092.pdf.
23 KEN ZIMMERMAN, ET AL., PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY: THE RISING 
THREAT TO LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERS, New Jersey Institute for Social Justice at 5-6 
(February 2002) [hereinafter PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY], available at
http://www.njisj.org/reports/predatory_lending.html.
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increase in property values – and corresponding availability of leveraged 
home equity – across the economic spectrum;24 tax incentives created by 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act which retained solely the mortgage interest 
rate as a category of tax-deductible consumer interest;25 and the 
emergence of nontraditional, nondepository mortgage service providers 
such as mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers, finance companies and 
even home improvement contractors.26
Perhaps the most important catalyst for the growth of subprime 
lending, however, has been the correspondingly accelerating process of 
securitizing subprime mortgages and selling them on the secondary 
market.27  This process has created a long funding pipeline connecting 
individual residential mortgage borrowers, loan originators (including 
mortgage brokers, home improvement contractors and an increasing 
variety of lending institutions), investment banks and investors of all 
kinds. 28
On one end of the pipeline, a mortgage broker arranges financing 
for a borrower from any number of mortgage lenders, such as finance 
companies, mortgage bankers, banks, thrifts or credit unions.29
Mortgage brokers typically charge points or fees for their services and 
thus make a commission off of the total loan amount at closing.30  In 
addition, brokers frequently negotiate with lenders to be paid a “yield 
spread premium” which represents the difference between the rate the 
lender proffered the broker to extend to the borrower and the actual rate 
the broker extended to the borrower.31  Home improvement contractors 
24 Margo Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate 
Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 119 (2002). 
25 Mansfield, supra note __ at 522.
26 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note___ at 39.
27 See Eggert supra note __ at 534-52.  The percentage of subprime mortgages 
that were securitized and sold on the secondary market increased from 32 percent in 
1994 to 55 percent in 1998, before dropping to 37 percent in 1999.  HUD-Treasury 
Joint Report, supra note__ at 40 and tbl. 3.4.
28 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 35.
29 Mortgage brokers now account for almost fifty percent of all subprime 
mortgage originations. The Problem, Impact and Responses: Hearing on Predatory 
Mortgage Lending Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 106th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of Neill Fendly, Immediate Past President of National 
Association of Mortgage Brokers). Brokers are heavily undercapitalized and, as a result 
rarely provide use their own funds to extend a loan.  HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra
note __ at 40.  Rather, they will typically close the loan in the lenders name, use “table 
funding” provided by a pre-designated purchaser of the loan, or access a line of credit 
from a finance company.  Eggert, supra note __ at 538.  
30 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note___at 40.
31 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 40.  Yield spread premiums 
create strong incentives for brokers to steer borrowers to a higher rate and are 
particularly problematic when they are not properly disclosed to borrowers in advance 
of the loan closing.  See Mansfield, supra note __ at 526. 
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often also originate mortgages for borrowers with pre-arranged lenders 
and are a significant source of abuse in the subprime lending process.32
A lender may hold a loan in its portfolio, collecting monthly 
mortgage payments as they come due and servicing the loan in all other 
respects.  Most subprime lenders, however, securitize their loans.  That 
is, lenders pool a large group of loans with similar risk grades together, 
securitize them and, through Wall Street investment banks, sell them to a 
vast secondary market of loan purchasers, which includes institutional 
investors, mutual funds and pension funds.33  The enormous growth of 
securitization has had an utterly transforming effect on the mortgage 
services market.  Securitization has simultaneously fueled the growth of 
subprime lending and the nontraditional, and comparatively 
underregulated, brokers and finance companies that dominate the 
market.34  By selling their loans to the secondary market, subprime 
lenders do not need to wait for monthly mortgage payments to be made 
by borrowers.  They thereby become free to finance new subprime 
loans.35  With each financing, they collect points and fees, and with each 
sale to the secondary market, they collect an interest point spread.36
The secondary market seems highly enamored with subprime 
lending because the rates of return are enormously profitable given the
overall risk profile of subprime borrowers.37  As an added benefit to 
secondary market investors, and as described below, the secondary 
market can take advantage of the holder-in-due-course rule, 38 which 
generally immunizes them, as good faith purchasers, from liability for 
any fraud perpetrated by a loan originator.39
32 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
33 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 41.
34 Eggert, supra note __ at 546.
35 Engel and McCoy, supra note __ at 1274.
36 Mansfield, supra note __ at 531.
37 See Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risks of Premature State 
Regulation of Predatory Lending, available at: 
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/00007106megriyjcceyllhml/PredReport20092.pdf; 
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. 
(2000) (testimony of Cathy Lesser Mansfield) [hereinafter Mansfield Testimony] 
(arguing that many subprime loans carry unjustified and “tremendously inflated costs”); 
see also Thomas Goetz, Loan Sharks, Inc., Village Voice, July 15, 1997 at 33 
(“subprime companies say their interest rates are so high to compensate for the greater 
risk these borrowers bring.  But a welcome side effect of high rates is the profits that 
traditional banks can’t hope to match.  According to Forbes, subprime consumer 
finance companies can enjoy returns up to six times greater than those of the best-run 
banks.  Corporate America hasn’t failed to notice.”) 
38 See generally U.C.C. § 3-302 and text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
39 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
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B. Predominance Of Subprime Lending In Minority 
Communities
Subprime lending is concentrated among low and moderate-
income borrowers due in part to their typically lower income-to-asset 
ratios and shorter or weaker credit histories.40  More highly troubling, 
however, is the remarkable predominance of subprime lending in African 
American neighborhoods.  Nationwide, fifty percent of all loans in 
predominantly African American neighborhoods are subprime, 
compared to only nine percent in predominantly white neighborhoods.41
Controlling for income, the disparity is even more stark: upper income 
African Americans are twice as likely as low income white borrowers to 
receive subprime credit.42  In New Jersey, controlling for income and 
other key variables, African Americans are more than three times as 
likely as white borrowers to receive a subprime home equity loan; 2.5 
times as likely as white borrowers to receive a subprime purchase money 
loan to buy a house; and, 1.4 times as likely as white borrowers to 
receive a subprime refinance loan.43  These disturbing statistics 
demonstrate that much subprime lending is not accurately correlated to 
credit risk and corroborates the strong suspicion that much of subprime 
lending is predatory – that is, it charges far too high a price for the credit 
risk presented by an individual borrower.44
C. The Link Between The Subprime Market And Predatory 
Lending
As mentioned, the large majority of subprime loans are neither 
predatory or in need of regulation.  However, certain lending practices, 
when done in connection with an already expensive subprime loan, are 
so abusive that they can properly be designated as predatory.  One core 
feature that these practices have in common is their tendency to unfairly 
strip equity from a borrower.  Typical predatory practices pad 
unnecessary charges in a loan and thereby decrease the value of the 
borrower’s ownership interest in her home.45  As a result, victims of 
predatory lending lose their primary – perhaps their only – source of 
wealth accumulation to the extent that they are unable to consistently 
make their loan payments or that actually causes them to lose their 
homes entirely.
40 Department of Housing and Urban Development, Unequal Burden: Income 
and Rational Disparities in Subprime America, at 3 (April 12, 2000) [hereinafter 
Unequal Burden].  In low to moderate income neighborhoods, 26% of refinance loans 
were subprime, compared to a national average of 11% and an average of seven percent 
in upper income neighborhoods.  Id.  In New Jersey, sixty percent of lending in low-
income areas is subprime.  PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY, supra note __ at 6.
41 Unequal Burden, supra note ___ at 3.
42 Id.
43 PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY, supra note __ at 7.  
44 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. (next section)
45 COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 4-5.
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These practices, it should be noted, are rarely present in the 
conventional lending industry or in the legitimate subprime industry.  
Indeed, they are present only in the predatory subset of the subprime 
lending market – a subset that has captured a significant share of the 
subprime market and appears resistant to competition from the legitimate 
lending market for a variety of reasons.  The most fundamental reason is 
that predatory lenders do prey on potential victims:  they employ unique, 
aggressive and often highly misleading marketing and sales techniques.  
In order to identify potential victims, predatory lenders may search 
census records to look for predominantly African American tracts; deed 
records to identify persons that either own their homes outright or should 
have substantial equity in them; and tax records to identify delinquent 
persons who may be in need of money.46  Predatory lenders and brokers 
then rely on direct marketing techniques – persistent calling or “live 
checks” – that are full of misleading enticements that have proven to be 
effective with the most vulnerable homeowners.  These homeowners 
tend to be highly unsophisticated about mortgage products and largely 
disconnected from the financial services market.47  As one self-confessed 
predatory lender described in testimony to the U.S. Senate, predatory 
lenders target “blue-collar workers, people who haven’t gone to college, 
older people who are on fixed incomes, non-English-speaking people 
and people who have significant equity in their homes.”48  Moreover, 
once a predatory lender has secured a victim, his goal is to keep 
returning in order to repeatedly flip the victim’s loan, churning 
additional fees and stripping additional equity each time.49
Legitimate subprime and conventional lenders do not, as a matter 
of course, engage in such aggressive marketing techniques.  They tend to 
attract borrowers who both need credit and are sophisticated enough to 
shop around for their options.50  However, once a borrower has been 
trapped in an equity-stripping loan, her loan-to-value ratio is likely too 
high to ever allow her to trade up to a legitimate subprime financing.  
Some of the most common and most damaging equity-stripping 
or otherwise unreasonable lending practices are:
46 ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW (ACORN), 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 34-35 (November 2002) 
[hereinafter SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL].  
47 Id; see also Eggert, supra note __ at 516.
48 Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing their Way to Profits: 
Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony 
of “Jim Dough”) [hereinafter Testimony of Jim Dough], available at: 
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr14jd.htm. see also id. (“my perfect customer would be 
an uneducated widow who is on a fixed income, hopefully from her deceased husband’s 
pension and social security – who has her house paid off, is living off of credit cards, 
but having a difficult time keeping up her payments, and who must make a car payment 
in addition to her credit card payments”).  
49 See infra note __. 
50 Engel and McCoy supra note __ at 1289-90.
MODEL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
10
1. Lending Without Regard to Ability to Repay
Predatory lenders often will make a loan based upon the value of 
the equity the borrower has in the home but without concern for whether 
the borrower has enough income to support monthly mortgage payments.  
The practice is sometimes referred to as “asset-based lending.”51  This 
practice sets up a borrower for assured default and eventual loss of her 
home.  Though foreclosure is typically costly and disfavored by 
legitimate mortgage lenders,52 participants in the predatory lending 
pipeline may be unconcerned about the likelihood of foreclosure on these 
loans.  Mortgage brokers will have received a commission at the outset 
from the loan proceeds (and have been known to exaggerate a 
borrower’s credentials when presenting an application for lender 
approval); a lender can then immediately securitize and sell the loan to 
the secondary market and recover the value of the loan immediately; and 
the secondary market investor can still recoup losses because the asset-
based lending is typically directed at borrowers who already have 
substantial equity in their homes.53 As we shall see below, HOSA does 
not directly address this practice.54
2. Financing Points and Fees
Points and fees charged in connection with predatory loans 
routinely amount to between five and eight percent of the loan amount.55
Points and fees can become even costlier because they are not paid in 
cash by the borrower but, rather, are financed as part of the total loan 
amount.  As a result, a subprime borrower will pay the already high 
interest associated with her loan to finance the points and fees.56
Financing points and fees can be dangerous because their costs are not 
transparent; such financing tends to obscure the true cost of the loan, 
particularly when many borrowers do not find out about the financing 
process until they are at closing.57 Financing of points and fees can be 
51 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 76.
52 WEICHER, supra note __ at 84.
53 Eggert, supra note __ at 550-60.
54 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
55 COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 6 (estimating that 750,000 
loans annually have points and fees that are in excess of five percent of the total loan 
value); see also SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 37 (reporting that 
borrowers in predatory loans are “routinely” charged just under eight percent of the 
loan amount in points and fees), available at
http://www.acorn.org/acorn10/predatorylending/plreports/report.htm. By contrast the 
average points and fees charged on conventional loans, if any are charged, is 1.1%.  
56 Mansfield Testimony, supra note __ (“the combination of high points and fees 
in a refinance loan and high rates translate into exorbitantly higher costs for the 
borrower - much higher than they would be if the borrower were lent the second 
mortgage or unsecured credit product he/she sought in the first place”).
57 COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 4; Ken Zimmerman, Director 
of New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, Speech at the Seton Hall Law School 
Predatory Lending Conference (June 17, 2003).
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particularly abusive when combined with other equity stripping devices 
such as loan flipping, which is described below.
3. Prepayment Penalties
Prepayment penalties are charges a borrower must pay if she 
wishes to pay off or refinance a loan, either through the same lender or a 
different one, before the loan term is complete.58  Prepayment penalties 
are virtually nonexistent in the prime industry where competition has 
mostly ended this practice.  Seventy percent of loans in the subprime 
market, however, contain prepayment penalties of approximately five 
percent of the total loan amount.59  Because prepayment penalties in a 
refinance are typically financed as part of the new loan rather than paid 
at closing, they drive up the cost of the new loan and thereby deplete a 
borrower’s equity.60  They are particularly objectionable where, as is 
frequently the case, a borrower was not aware of the prepayment 
provision in her initial loan.61  HOSA does not directly limit imposition 
of prepayment penalties, but does indirectly address the issue by putting 
a cap on the amount of points that can be refinanced along with high cost 
loans.
4. Packing Single Premium Insurance Products 
Predatory lenders often “pack” unnecessary and costly insurance 
products to pay off the borrower’s loan in the event of sickness, 
disability or death, into subprime loans and finance them without the 
borrower’s informed consent.62  Unlike traditional insurance premiums, 
which are paid on a monthly basis, subprime mortgage insurance 
products are frequently sold as “single premium” in which five years 
worth of premiums are paid up front in one lump sum, but financed over 
the (usually longer) term of the loan.  Such single premium credit 
insurance is abusive because its cost is rarely properly disclosed to 
borrowers:63 it is estimated to cost up to four to five times as much as 
unfinanced premium insurance that the borrower pays periodically.64
Indeed, a leading consumer advocacy group has called the financing of 
single premium credit insurance “the worst insurance rip off in the 
country.”65
58 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 90.
59 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__at 92.
60 COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 8 (estimating that prepayment 
penalties on subprime loans cost borrowers $2.3 billion a year).
61 Id.
62 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 86-88.
63 COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 6.
64 SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 42.  In addition, lenders have 
strong incentives to pack such insurance products because they receive an average of 
30% commission from the insurance company on the sale.  COST OF PREDATORY 
LENDING, supra note __ at 7.  
65 Consumers Union, Credit Insurance: The $2 Billion A Year Rip-Off (March 
1999), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/credit_info_page.htm. 
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5. Loan Flipping 
Loan flipping refers to the practice of repeatedly refinancing a 
borrower’s loan (typically within the first few years of the loan term) 
with a fee-loaded loan, without reasonable benefit to the borrower.66
Subprime borrowers are frequently solicited by predatory lenders to 
refinance their loans with assurances that their monthly payments will be 
lower (by extending the loan term) or suggestions that they could use 
cash to consolidate other consumer debts.  The refinancings typically 
contain high points and fees as well as prepayment penalties, which 
provide additional revenue to lenders and brokers, but materially deplete 
the equity that borrowers retains in their home.67  Flipping depends on 
the skill and confidence of individual lender representatives or brokers, 
who are persistent in winning the trust of consumers and otherwise 
assuring them that the time is especially right to take advantage of 
refinancing.68  Indeed, loan flipping is a core weapon in predatory 
lenders’ arsenal.  Their ultimate goal is to lock a borrower into one 
abusive loan, and return over and over to the borrower to siphon equity 
out of her home and into their own pockets.69  Once a borrower is 
trapped in this equity-depleting cycle, it becomes next to impossible to 
escape by refinancing with a legitimate lender on favorable terms. 
6. Balloon Payments, Advance Payments, Default 
Interest Rates and Discretionary Call Provisions
Balloon payments are traditionally a full lump sum payment that 
occurs at the end of the fixed loan repayment term, which pays off the 
remainder of what the previous monthly payments did not fully cover.70
Frequently, victims of predatory lending are either deceived about the 
existence of a balloon provision in their loan; or such borrowers are 
falsely reassured that they can refinance at a lower rate in the future 
when, in fact, predatory lenders will use an impending balloon payment 
66 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 73.
67 For example, in Cammarano v. Associates, Civ. No. F-13509-97 (Chanc. Div., 
Hudson Cty), a woman obtained a $28,000 home equity loan from Associates.  After 
the Ms. Cammarano had difficulty making her payments, Associates initiated contact 
with her and refinanced the loan three times in two years, increasing her total 
indebtedness to $56,000, which was primarily comprised of points and fees.  
68 Engel and McCoy, supra note __ at 1283 (“[p]redatory lenders … endear 
themselves with charm and guile.  They consciously exude an aura of expertise and 
success, intimidating customers from questioning the advisability of the loans they are 
offering”).  
69 Testimony of Jim Dough, supra note __ (explaining that predatory finance 
companies “require branch employees to make contact every three months with 
customers to prevent payoffs and up-sell to bigger loans.  At some of my branches, we 
tried to call every one of our real estate customers at least once a month.  The purpose 
of these contacts was to flip as many loans as possible.  Our tactic was to try to gain the 
trust and confidence of the customer”).
70 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 96.
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to force the borrower to accept the flip of the loan so that the lender can 
extract additional points and fees.71
Advance payment provisions require that borrowers prepay a 
certain amount of interest at closing that would otherwise be payable 
over the course of the loan.72  Default interest rate provisions, which 
substantially increase the interest rate owed upon any default --
sometimes by amounts up to 40% -- can be deeply unfair because they 
make it very difficult for a borrower to cure a default and set them up for 
quick foreclosure or refinancing at outrageous terms.73  Call provisions 
allow a lender to demand payment of the full loan amount at the lenders’ 
sole discretion.74  All three provisions are typically included without the 
borrowers’ knowledge and understanding.75  These provisions also 
provide an unscrupulous lender the excuse to initiate contact and the 
leverage to coerce a borrower to refinance with another high-fee loan in 
order to avoid application of those devastating terms.
7. Negative Amortization
Negative amortization is a type of loan structure in which the 
monthly payments do not even cover interest charges, causing the 
principal to increase – rather than decrease – over the life of the loan.76
Because negative amortization causes a borrower to steadily lose equity 
each month, it is virtually never in a borrower’s interest to accept such a 
loan term.  Not surprisingly, many borrowers report that their 
unscrupulous lenders did not explain how such loan structure would 
work.77
8. Home Improvement Contractor Abuse
Unscrupulous home improvement contractors frequently pass 
through poor and minority neighborhoods looking for homes that are in 
disrepair and therefore susceptible to a home improvement pitch.78  The 
contractors will offer to arrange financing with a pre-arranged lender, 
who agrees to pay the contractor directly from the loan proceeds.  
Because the borrower is not directly paying the contractor, she has no 
leverage over the timing or quality of the contractor’s work.  As a result, 
unscrupulous contractors can walk away with substantial payments, but 
leaving the promised repairs unfinished, shabbily done or even 
71 SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 41.
72 See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A 
GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 46 (2002) ("Some lenders collect these payments 
upfront at closing to disguise the real amount of credit extended to increase the 
consumer's obligation to pay interest."). 
73 National Consumer Law Center, TRUTH IN LENDING § 10.4.3 (4th ed. 1999).
74 SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 40.
75 Id.
76 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 91.
77 SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 41.
78 SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 39.
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unattempted, and leaving the borrower with an unwanted and abusive 
home equity loan from the complicit lender.79
D. Predatory Lending’s Wake: An Epidemic Of Foreclosures
Predatory lending has real, measurable and significantly more 
negative consequences than those associated with other types of 
consumer fraud.  It has caused a rash of foreclosures in New Jersey, 
causing devastating financial and emotional harm to individual victims 
and rippling damage throughout the low-income and minority 
neighborhoods where predatory practices are concentrated.  
For example, in Essex County, New Jersey, the number of 
residential foreclosures increased from 1,701 in 1995 to 2,516 in 2000 as 
the percentage share of those foreclosures attributable to subprime loans 
increased from 18.8% to 29.6%.80  The data appears to demonstrate that 
foreclosures have not merely tracked the increase in overall subprime 
lending, but that subprime and predatory lending has prematurely forced 
disproportionately greater numbers of foreclosures.  For example, 
between 1995 and 2000, the rate of subprime foreclosures was double 
the rate of subprime originations in Northern New Jersey counties.  At 
the same time, the speed at which loans went into foreclosure – a result 
of loans that were unmanageable from the start or had serious equity 
stripping practices – increased dramatically.  The average age of a loan 
in foreclosure dropped from 6.7 years in 1995 to 4.0 years half a decade 
later.81  The highest concentrations of defaults are in largely African 
American sections of southern and western Newark, Irvington and East 
Orange.82
A foreclosure on a residential home puts a family through a 
devastating period of emotional and financial distress.83  In addition, 
when foreclosures are concentrated in particular neighborhoods, once-
healthy communities suffer from the externalities associated with largely 
abandoned tracts of land: a decrease in overall property values, an 
79 HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 39.
80 PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY, supra note __ at 8.  In the first half of 
2001, foreclosures increased an additional 15%.  According to the study, these figures 
are significantly understated because they do not take into account foreclosures 
accomplished by secondary holders of mortgage notes, which represents approximately 
half of all subprime mortgage note holders.  Id.
81 Id. at 6, 8.
82 Id. at 8.
83 WEICHER, supra note __ at 84 (acknowledging that “[t]he consequences [home 
foreclosure] can be tragic – the loss of a home that may represent all the assets of a 
family, the necessity of uprooting the family and moving to a less desirable residence”); 
Eggert, supra note __ at 581 (describing range of devastating emotions and problems 
encountered by families subjected to home foreclosure).
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increase in crime, and a corresponding need for greater law enforcement 
and other government services.84
The explosion of foreclosures caused by predatory lending 
appears more tragic when one considers that the vast majority of victims 
of predatory lending already owned their homes.  Over 80% of subprime 
lending is not for the purchase of a home, but rather primarily for cash-
out refinancings or to consolidate debt.85  Thus, many homeowners are 
losing their houses because a complex and new form of consumer debt 
products has been sold to them on utterly unreasonable terms.86
E. The Limitations Of Pre-HOSA Remedies
In enacting HOSA, New Jersey recognized that the phenomenon 
of predatory lending was too broad and persistent to be controlled by 
pre-existing remedies.  State law misrepresentation remedies typically 
reach only outright misrepresentation by lenders.  Federal disclosure 
statutes, such as the Truth in Lending Act, are utterly ineffective in 
warning borrowers about all the pitfalls of predatory loans.  Moreover, 
the federal high cost home loan statute upon which HOSA builds – the 
Home Ownership Equity Protection Act – includes too small a 
proportion of home loans within its regulatory scope.  
Moreover, much of the effectiveness of these remedies is actually 
eliminated by the common law holder-in-due-course doctrine, which 
largely insulates the good faith purchasers of predatory loans from 
liability for the illegal conduct of loan originators.  As described below, 
HOSA increases loan disclosure requirements, bolsters current consumer 
fraud protections in the home loan area, supplements protections for 
classes of high cost loans and, very importantly, eliminates in many 
cases, the liability barriers created by the holder-in-due-course doctrine.
1. Pre-HOSA Remedies
The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”),87 though 
considered one of the most consumer-friendly statutes in the nation,88
only applies to misrepresentations, material omissions, or overall 
unconscionable conduct.89  While such conduct is obviously present in 
84 Senate Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of William 
J. Brennan, Jr. Director, Home Defense Program of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, 
Inc.).
85 Of the 80% of subprime loans that are used for refinancing, 59% are cash-out 
loans.  HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 31.
86 Mansfied Testimony, supra note __ (emphasizing that a large proportion of 
subprime foreclosures result from subprime debt consolidation refinancings that were 
misunderstood by the borrower, not really needed or on unfair terms).  
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-2.
88 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 (1994) (noting that New Jersey 
has “one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the nation” and should be 
“construed liberally in favor of consumers.”) The Consumer Fraud Act mandates treble 
damages and attorneys fees.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-2.
89 Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgt. Corp. of America, 289 N.J. Super. 489 (1996).
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many predatory loans – though notoriously difficult to prove – the 
Consumer Fraud Act does little to prohibit predatory practices such as 
asset-based lending, loan flipping, insurance fee packing, and financing 
excessive points and fees.  In addition, CFA claims cannot be asserted 
against the substantial number of secondary market holders of predatory 
mortgage notes, either as an affirmative claim or as a defense to 
foreclosure because the holder-in-due-course rule immunizes a good 
faith purchaser of a note from most claims that could have been asserted 
against a loan originator, no matter how meritorious the claim is.90
Second, the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) mandates 
certain important disclosures in connection with a home loan including 
the annual percentage rate (APR), the total amount financed which must 
include a calculation of points and fees charged, the monthly payment 
amount and number of payments necessary to pay off the loan entirely.91
It also authorizes actual damages, statutory damages of double the 
finance charge and attorneys fees for any violations.92  However, TILA 
offers too little in the fight against predatory lending – it fails to include 
more obvious and less technical disclosures that much of the 
unsophisticated population that succumbs to predatory lenders needs; too 
late – the TILA disclosures are made at the loan closing when a borrower 
has already psychologically committed; and too confusing – the 
disclosures come included in a bewildering stack of loan documents.93
In sum, TILA is not sufficient, standing alone, to warn vulnerable 
borrowers about the true costs of a loan.
Finally, in 1994, Congress enacted the Home Ownership Equity 
Protection Act (“HOEPA”), which placed direct limits on certain 
practices if made in connection with a “high cost loan.”94  Specifically, 
HOEPA protections apply if a loan meets one of two high cost loan 
triggers: (i) where the APR exceeds by eight percent the yield on 
Treasury securities of comparable maturity for first lien loans (or above 
ten percent for subordinate lien loans) (the “rate trigger” or “APR 
trigger”); or (ii) where the total of all the loan’s points and fees exceeds 
eight percent of the loan total or $400 (adjusted for inflation), whichever 
is greater (the “fee trigger”).95  Regulation Z, promulgated under 
HOEPA by the Federal Reserve Board, specifies which charges count as 
90 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.  .
91 15 U.S.C. § 1638.
92 15 USC §1640(a)(1)-(3).
93 See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding and High Cost 
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
807, 881-83 (2003) (describing serious problems TILA has for controlling fraud in the 
home loan context).
94 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2002)
95 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1), 3 (2000), 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2002).  The fee 
trigger was lowered by Federal Reserve Board in 2001, from ten percent above 
comparable Treasury securities (for either first or second lien loans).  66 Fed. Reg. 
65606, 65608-65610 (Dec. 20, 2001).
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points and fees to be included in the fee trigger and includes 
compensation to a mortgage broker in the form of a yield spread 
premium96 and, after recent amendments to Regulation Z, optional credit 
insurance.97
HOEPA prohibits inclusion of certain loan terms in high cost 
loans that tend to be predatory.  For such loans, HOEPA prohibits 
negative amortization without exception,98 balloon payments on loans 
with terms of five or fewer years,99 loan terms that increase the interest 
rate in the event of a default,100 and prepayment penalties in certain cases 
for financially vulnerable borrowers.101  HOEPA creditors are prohibited 
from engaging in asset-based lending – lending without regard to a 
borrower’s ability to pay102 – but only if they have engaged in a “pattern 
or practice of such activity.”103  Recent amendments to Regulation Z also 
place limits on loan flipping:  creditors or their affiliates are forbidden 
from refinancing a HOEPA-covered loan within a year, unless the 
refinancing is “in the borrowers’ interest.”104  Damages for violations of 
HOEPA include all those available under TILA plus enhanced statutory 
96 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4)(B), 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1)(ii).
97 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii), (b)(1)(iv).  Real estate charges such as title 
insurance, filing and recording fees must also be included unless the charges are 
reasonable, offers no direct or indirect compensation to the creditor, and is paid to a 
third party unaffiliated with the creditor.  12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(iii).
98 15 U.S.C. § 1539(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2).
99 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(1); Official Staff Commentary, § 
226.32(c)(3).  For loan terms that exceed five years, balloon payments are permissible, 
but must be disclosed.  See text accompanying supra note __.  
100 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(4).    
101 Prepayment penalties are permitted only if (i) the loan will not cause the 
borrower to pay more than fifty percent of their income to the monthly payments; (ii) 
income and expenses are verified by financial statement signed by the consumer and 
supported by a credit report; (iii) creditor is not refinancing one of its own or an 
affiliate’s loans; (iv) if it occurs within the first five years of the loan; and (v) the 
penalty is legal under state law.  15 U.S.C. § 1639(c).  
102 HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit “based on the consumer’s 
collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’ 
current and expected income, current obligations, and employment.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1639(h).  
103 Traditionally, the pattern or practice element of the prohibition has been a hard 
one for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring proof of several instances of prohibited conduct in 
short period of time.  Newton v. United Companies Financial Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 
444, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1998).  The recent amendments have loosened the requirement 
somewhat, creating a presumptive violation where the lender has failed to document 
and verify the borrower’s ability to pay.  66 Fed. Reg. 65606, 65608-65610 (Dec. 20, 
2001).
104 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2002).  In considering whether a refinancing is in 
the borrower’s interest, Regulation Z instructs lenders to consider the totality of the 
borrower’s circumstances at the time the credit was extended.  Id.
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damages in the amount of the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by 
the consumer.105
HOEPA’s scope, however, is narrow in two important respects.  
First, HOEPA does not cover purchase money mortgages (that is, those 
used to purchase homes) or open-end lines of credit (such as home equity 
lines of credit).106  Moreover, as consumer advocates have been arguing 
for years, the HOEPA high cost loan triggers are too high.  Predatory 
lenders are notoriously successful for offering loans at rates and with 
points and fees just below the high HOEPA triggers and thereby evading 
regulation. 107
2. Holder-in-due-course Rule’s Elimination of 
Assignee Liability
Another significant limitation on remedies available to victims of 
predatory lending is the Uniform Commercial Code’s holder-in-due-
course rule.108  The rule insulates noteholders in the secondary market 
from most defenses by borrowers – including fraud-related ones – which 
the borrower could have raised against the original creditor.109  The FTC 
has fully abrogated the holder-in-due course rule’s application to the sale 
of “consumer goods,” which makes the rule unavailable to assignees of 
loans involving manufactured homes or home improvements.110
Similarly, HOEPA has abrogated the rule for loans it covers, making 
good faith assignees potentially liable for all claims and subject to all 
defenses a debtor could have raised against the loan originator unless the 
assignee can demonstrate that “a reasonable person exercising due 
105 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).  HOEPA, like TILA, has a one-year statute of limitations 
for affirmative suits, but can be raised any time – including against assignees – as a 
defense to foreclosure.  15 U.S.C. §. 1640(c).
106 Open-end credit is a credit extension where the exact amount of money lent or 
advanced at any given time is not fixed.  15 U.S.C. §1602(i).  It is, in short, a line of 
credit. In order to qualify as an open-end loan, TILA and Regulation Z require that 
creditors demonstrate that their credit plan meet three specific elements.  A creditor 
under a plan must: (i) reasonably contemplate repeated transactions; (ii) may impose a 
finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and (iii) generally 
replenishes the amount of credit available to the consumer to the extent that any 
outstanding balance is repaid.  15 U.S.C. §1602(i); 12 C.F.R. §226.2(a)(20).  Open-end 
lines of credit are being more frequently used in the home loan context.  
107 TRUTH IN LENDING supra note __ at §10.1.1.
108 U.C.C. §3-302 (2003).  The rule applies to purchasers of mortgages if they are: 
(1) a holder; (2) of a negotiable note; (3) who took the note for value; (4) in good faith; 
(5) without notice of the defenses to the note.  See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §14-2 (4th ed. 1995).
109 The only “real” defenses that survive the protections for good faith 
noteholders are severely limited.  They include infancy, duress, lack of legal capacity or 
illegality of transaction, fraud in the factum involving, for example, forged signature, 
insolvency of the debtor.  WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note __ §14-10.
110 FTC Holder in Due Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1978).  
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diligence” could not have revealed that the loan was covered by 
HOEPA.111
Nevertheless, in the large category of non-HOEPA home 
purchase or refinance loans that are sold to the secondary market, the 
holder-in-due-course rule poses a substantial impediment to borrowers 
seeking redress for predatory loans and likewise renders them virtually 
helpless to contest foreclosures brought by secondary market mortgage 
noteholders, no matter how abusive or fraudulent the underlying loan.112
As a result, the holder-in-due course rule creates little incentive for the 
secondary market to police predatory practices of loan originators.  
Consumer advocates have persistently argued, therefore, that for any 
remedy for predatory lending to be fully effective, it must include a 
provision that imposes liability against assignees of abusive loans both to 
offer borrowers protection against foreclosure and to force the secondary 
market to cut off funding to predatory lenders.113
II. THE NEW JERSEY HOME OWNERSHIP SECURITY ACT: ATTEMPTING 
TO CURB THE WORST AND PROTECT THE BEST OF THE SUBPRIME 
MARKET
On May 1, 2003, Governor James McGreevey signed the New 
Jersey Home Ownership Security Act (“HOSA” or the “Act”) into 
law.114  It will apply to most New Jersey purchase money and home 
equity loans that close on or after November 27, 2003.115  The stated 
purpose of the Act is to “encourage lending at reasonable rates with 
reasonable terms” so as to strengthen the viability of many communities 
and increase home ownership.116  HOSA is designed to accomplish this 
goal by prohibiting certain mortgage lending practices deemed either 
categorically unjustifiable or abusive when made in connection with 
loans that already have very high interest rates or points and fees 
structures.  Consumer advocates consider the Act a landmark measure 
that will protect New Jersey’s most financially vulnerable homeowners 
from predatory lenders and offer a reprieve against the rash of unfair 
111 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).  Due diligence requires that the purchaser examine all 
loan documentation required by TILA plus the itemization of amount financed and any 
other disclosures.  TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note __, §10.7.2 (4th ed. 1999).  
112 See, Eggert, supra note __ at __ -__ (discussing substantial costs securitization 
and the holder-in-due-course rule have imposed in the subprime mortgage market).
113 See, e.g. Eggert, supra note __ at 617 (“the surest solution to the problem of 
predatory lending is to force the markets that fund subprime lenders to police those 
lenders, and the surest way to force this private policing effort is to ensure that the 
buyers of predatory loans bear any risk of loss associated with the sharp practices of the 
lender, rather than having that loss borne by the lender.”) 
114 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-22, et seq. (2003).
115 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-35(15) (2003); see N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-31 (10) 
(2003); N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15, at 1 (July 25, 
2003).
116 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-23(2)(b)-(c) (2003).
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home foreclosures that are concentrated in New Jersey’s minority and 
low-income neighborhoods.117
Members of the subprime lending industry, argue that the Act is 
unnecessary in light of existing remedies and may even be 
counterproductive, but nevertheless agree that the Act will significantly 
alter subprime lending practices in the state.118  Industry representatives 
also argue that the Act is ambiguous and fails to give creditors sufficient 
guidance as to how they should comply with the new law.119  The 
subprime lending industry has looked to the New Jersey Department of 
Banking and Insurance (“DOBI”) for additional guidance.  But, while the 
New Jersey legislature has given DOBI significant investigatory and 
enforcement powers under the Act,120 it has granted DOBI only limited 
regulatory authority to interpret the Act.121
Indeed, DOBI has only been authorized to promulgate 
regulations to effectuate the Act’s provisions relating to (i) mandatory 
disclosure notices and loan counseling programs for prospective High 
Cost Home Loan borrowers and (ii) additional consumer counseling and 
awareness programs for all prospective Home Loan borrowers.  DOBI, 
notwithstanding its lack of statutory authority, has issued a Bulletin to 
provide guidance to potential creditors as to the meaning of a number of 
117 See, e.g., Ken Zimmerman and Linda Fisher, Progress in the Fight against 
Predatory Lending, THE NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 16, 2003, at 23 (023 2003 WL 
55555939); see also Editorial, Predatory Lending, NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, May 
12, 2003 (NJ enacts a “national model in state legislative efforts to combat the range of 
abusive mortgage lending practices collectively referred to as predatory lending.”); 
MBANJ Backs Compromise, Origination News, April 2003.
118 Jim Goryeb, Loan Law is a Bad Risk for Jersey, THE NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 
May 9, 2003 at __ (031 2003 WL 19921382).
119 ReedSmith, LLP, A. 75 New Jersey’s New Anti-Predatory Lending Law, Client 
Bulletin 2003-37, at 6 (May 2003), available at 
http://www.reedsmith.co.uk/library/publicationMore.cfm?currentpage=2&catid=14&ar
chive=1. 
120 The Act provides DOBI with significant investigatory powers.  See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 46:10B-28(7)(a)-(c).  It also provides DOBI with substantial remedial powers for 
violations of the Act, authorizing DOBI to: impose civil penalties of up to $10,000 for 
each offense, suspend, revoke or refuse to renew any license issued by DOBI; remove 
from her position a person responsible for a violation of the Act; order a person to cease 
and desist from any violation of the Act and make restitution to borrowers for damages; 
and any other conditions that the Department deems necessary and appropriate. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. 46:10B-28(7)(d) (2003).
121 When the Act was initially pre-filed for introduction into the 2002 New Jersey 
legislative session, it contained the language, “the Commissioner of Banking and 
Insurance shall promulgate regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," 
P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) necessary to effectuate the provisions of this act.”
Bill S. 2187 § 12 as Introduced and Referred To Senate Commerce Committee (Mar. 8, 
2001) (emphasis added).  This language clearly granted DOBI a broad mandate to 
interpret the Act.  The final version of the bill, however, was revised to read, “necessary 
to effectuate the provisions of subsections f. and g. of section 5 and section 11 of this 
act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-35(14) (2003).
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the Act’s ambiguous provisions.122  While such guidelines are not 
binding, they have some persuasive authority, given DOBI’s mandate to 
protect and educate “consumers and promotes the growth, financial 
stability and efficiency of” the banking industry.123  Nonetheless, where 
DOBI’s guidance is inconsistent with the plain text of the Act (as we 
demonstrate in several places in this Article), its authority is obviously 
significantly reduced.
A. The Act’s Scope: Regulating Most Home Loans A Little, But 
High Cost Home Loans A Lot
The Act designates three classes of loans – “home loans,” 
“covered loans,” and “high cost loans” – and subjects creditors who issue 
them, as well as the secondary market investors who purchase them, to 
increasing levels of regulation.  The New Jersey legislature concluded 
that the Act’s prohibitions on practices associated with the extremely 
broad category of Home Loans, such as financing single premium credit 
insurance and encouraging borrowers to default, are per se unreasonable 
in the mortgage context and can virtually never be economically 
justified.124  The legislature also appears to have recognized that high 
cost loans, ones that have either very high rates or points and fees 
structures, render borrowers increasingly susceptible to default and 
foreclosure and, at the same time, are typically extended to borrowers 
that are low-income, financially unsophisticated, and thereby particularly 
vulnerable to the abuses of predatory lenders.  Accordingly, the Act bans 
numerous additional loan terms when made in connection with high cost 
loans, such as balloon payments, negative amortizations, default interest 
rates, while also mandating clear disclosures and, in certain cases, loan 
counseling.125  Undoubtedly reflecting a legislative compromise, the Act 
bans the particularly dangerous practice of loan flipping for “Covered 
Home Loans,” a category somewhat broader than high cost loans.
1. Application to Creditors
The Act only governs only Home Loans made by “creditors,” 
defined as those who extend consumer credit that is (i) subject to a 
finance charge or (ii) payable by five or more installments and to whom 
the obligation is payable at any time.126  This definition appears intended 
to screen out informal lenders, such as family members who do not 
extend “consumer credit.”  Notably, the term “creditor” also includes 
mortgage brokers as well as anyone who directly or indirectly solicits, 
processes, places or negotiates Home Loans for others, which ensures 
that all parties who are involved in arranging financing are subject to its 
prohibitions and penalties.127  It also ensures that those who finance – but 
do not arrange –Home Loans cannot avoid regulation by assigning 
various lending tasks, such as solicitation and origination to different 
122 N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15 (July 25, 2003).
123 DOBI Mission Statement, at http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/dobimiss.htm.
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entities.128  This broad definition of creditor appears to include home 
improvement contractors and manufactured home sellers who have 
significant involvement in arranging a Home Loan.129
2. Three Tiers of Home Loan Coverage
The Act classifies three types of residential mortgage loans and 
subjects each to different levels of regulation.  First, the Act defines the 
very broad category of “Home Loans” as extensions of credit to 
borrowers secured by either: (i) a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate 
for a one-to-six family dwelling that is or will be occupied by the 
borrower as her principal dwelling; or (ii) a security interest in a 
“manufactured home”130 which is or will be occupied by a borrower as 
her principal dwelling.131  Exceeding the scope of protections offered by 
HOEPA, the Act also covers purchase money mortgages (for initial 
home purchases) and open-ended lines of credit;132 like HOEPA, the Act 
does excludes “reverse mortgage transactions” from its regulatory 
124 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (2003).
125 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(a)-(g) (2003).
126 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Creditors”) (2003).
127 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Creditors”) (2003).
While including mortgage brokers within the definition of “Creditor,” the Act 
also provides a meaningful limitation for the scope of that liability:  
Notwithstanding any provision of this act to the contrary, a mortgage 
broker shall be
liable under the provisions of this act only for acts performed by the 
mortgage broker in the course of providing mortgage brokering 
services. However, a mortgage broker may be held liable for acts 
performed by the mortgage broker outside the scope of mortgage 
brokering services if the acts are related to the purchasing or the 
making of a home loan and are otherwise prohibited under this act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-33(12) (2003).  Thus, a mortgage broker acting qua
mortgage broker is only liable for her own violations of the Act and is not 
jointly and severally liable along with the creditor for the creditor’s actions.  
The Act also excludes from the definition of creditor, attorneys and title 
insurers who are unaffiliated with the lender.  Id.
128 See Eggert, supra note__ at  (describing how lending industry structures itself 
to avoid liability to borrowers).
129 See N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Creditor”) (2003).
130 The category of manufactured homes includes modular homes, panelized 
homes, pre-cut homes, and mobile homes. Manufactured Home Institute Website, at 
http://www.manufacturedhousing.org/lib/showtemp_detail.asp?id=74&cat=1 (last 
visited August 29, 2003).  
131 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Home Loan”) (2003).
132 Open-end credit plans represent a credit extension where the exact amount of 
money lent or advanced at any given time is not fixed.  See 15 U.S.C. §1602(i) (2003).  
Because open-end home equity lines of credit have been increasingly utilized by 
borrowers, including subprime borrowers, HOSA’s express regulation of such loans is a 
significant increase of scope over that of HOEPA.  See supra note __.
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scope.133  The large majority of residential mortgage loans in New Jersey 
would fall into the Act’s classification of Home Loans.  By definition, 
Home Loans include the more restrictive categories of Covered Home 
Loans and High Cost Home Loans, which are described below.  
Second, the Act classifies certain subset of Home Loans as 
“Covered Home Loans,” which are defined by reference to a points and 
fees trigger that is lower than those for High Cost Loans (defined below) 
and therefore covers a broader proportion of high-fee loans.  Covered 
Home Loans are Home Loans where the total points and fees payable in 
connection with the loan exceed (i) four percent of the total loan amount 
for loans of more than $40,000 or (ii) four and a half percent of the total 
loan amount if it is $40,000 or less or if it is insured by the Fair Housing 
Administration (“FHA”) or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (“VA”).134  Excluded from the definition of points and fees are 
conventional prepayment penalties or not more than two “bona fide 
discount points” (“BFDP,” defined below).135  The definition of Covered 
Home Loans contains no cap for the principal amount of such loans.  In 
addition, by definition, Covered Home Loans include all High Cost 
Home Loans.136
Finally, “High Cost Home Loans” – the narrowest and most 
heavily regulated subset of loans – are Home Loans with a principal 
amount of less than $350,000 (such amount to be adjusted annually)137
that, like a HOEPA-covered loan, exceeds a specified interest rate or 
points and fees threshold.  The interest rate threshold under HOSA is 
defined by incorporating the APR triggers set by HOEPA and the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z.138  Thus, HOSA’s interest rate 
133 Reverse mortgage transactions are mortgages that reverse the direction of 
payments.  They are typically used by older homeowners, who can borrow against the 
substantial equity in their homes to receive periodic cash payments.  Repayment of the 
loan amount is not required until the borrower transfers the dwelling, ceases to occupy 
it as a primary residence or dies.  See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(bb) 
(2003).
134 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Covered Home Loan”) (2003).
135 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Covered Home Loan”) (2003).  For example, 
(and excluding up to two bona fide discount points), a $100,000 Home Loan would be a 
Covered Home Loan if its points and fees were more than $4,000; a $10,000 Home 
Loan would be a Covered Home Loan if its points and fees were more than $450; and a 
$100,000 VA or FHA Home Loan would be a Covered Home Loan if its points and 
fees were more than $4,500.
136 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Covered Home Loan” (2)) (2003).
137 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“High Cost Home Loan”) (2003).  The 
$350,000 threshold will be adjusted each year to include the last published increase of 
the housing component of the national Consumer Price Index, NY-Northeastern NJ 
Region.  By way of example, that component increased 4% from July 2002 to July 
2003.  United States Department of Labor, New York-Northern New Jersey CPI Up 0.4 
Percent In July; 3.0 Percent Increase From Year Ago (available at 
http://www.bls.gov/ro2/cpinynj.htm).  Last checked August 29, 2003.
138 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Threshold” (1)) (2003).  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1602(aa) (2003); 12 C.F.R. § 262.32 (2003).  This determination is made without 
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trigger, like HOEPA’s, is eight percent above the prevailing interest rate 
on a Treasury security of a comparable maturity for first lien mortgages, 
and ten percent above the prevailing Treasury security rate for a second 
lien mortgage.139  At the time HOSA was enacted (May 1, 2003), a 
twenty- year fixed interest Treasury security (the relevant comparable 
security for a thirty year mortgage) carried an interest rate of 4.93%.140
Accordingly, under both HOEPA and HOSA, only those loans with an 
APR of 12.93% or higher would be classified and regulated as High Cost 
Loans.141  Indeed, the High Cost Loan threshold averages approximately 
a full seven percent above the national average interest rate of 5.7% for a 
fixed rate 30-year home loan measured at the time of HOSA’s passage142
and, therefore covers a narrow category of very expensive loans.  
Under HOSA, the classification and heavy regulation of a home 
loan as a High Cost Home Loan is also triggered if the loan meets a 
certain “total points and fees threshold.”143  HOEPA’s points and fees 
threshold is set fairly high, at eight percent of the total loan value.144
regard to whether the loan transaction is or may be a “Residential Mortgage 
Transaction,” as defined in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24) (2003).  N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-
24(3) (“Threshold”(1)) (2003).  A Residential Mortgage Transaction is a loan to finance 
the acquisition or initial construction of a principal dwelling.  12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a) (24) 
(2003). While such types of loans do not fall within the ambit of HOEPA, they do fall 
within that of HOSA. Thus, HOSA, unlike HOEPA, applies to purchase money and 
construction mortgages for primary dwellings.
139 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2003), 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2003).  
HOEPA’s APR trigger had been lowered by the Federal Reserve Board in 2001, from a 
threshold of ten percent (for both first and second lien loans) above comparable 
Treasury securities.  66 Fed. Reg. 65606, 65608-65610 (Dec. 20, 2001).
140 Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15 Selected Interest Rates. April 21, 
2003, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/20030421/ (last checked August 
29, 2003).  The HOEPA and HOSA trigger for a first-lien mortgage is eight points 
above "the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity to the 
loan maturity as of the fifteenth day of the month immediately preceding the month in 
which the application for the extension of credit is received by the creditor."  12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.32(a)(1)(i).  Because the federal government has recently stopped issuing 30-year 
Treasuries, the Federal Reserve Board staff has interpreted the Regulation Z trigger 
language to mean that lenders should use the yield for 20-year constant maturities in 
place of the yield for 30-year maturities.  12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) Comment. 
226.32(a)(1)(i)-4(iii).  These yields may be determined from the Board's "Selected 
Interest Rates" (statistical release H-15).  Id. at Comment. 226.32(a)(1)(i)-4.
141 As the yield for 20-year constant maturities on April 15th, 2003, was 4.93%, 
the precise HOEPA rate trigger for a thirty-year fixed interest loan for which the 
creditor received the application on May 1, 2003 (the day the Act was signed) is 
12.93%.
142 See Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey Weekly Mortgage Market 
Survey 2003 Weekly Mortgage Rates Releases (available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/cgi-
in/dLink.cgi?jp=/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp&ENV=PROD).  (last checked 
August 29, 2003).  The points and fees national average for loans during that period is 
.6 percent.  Id.
143 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Total Points And Fees Threshold”) (2003).
144 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(3) (2003).
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HOSA’s points and fees threshold is uniformly lower than HOEPA’s, 
but employs a sliding scale, allowing lenders to charge higher points and 
fees – and avoid a loan’s High Cost designation – for loans that have 
lower values.  Under the Act, the points and fees trigger is met where the 
borrower is charged, at loan closing: (i) for total loan amounts of 
$40,000 or greater, five percent or more of the total loan amount; (ii) for 
total loan amounts of $20,000 to $39,000, six percent of the total loan 
amount; and (iii) for total loan amounts of $1 to $19,999, the lesser of 
$1000 or six percent.145  The Act specifically excludes from the 
calculation of points and fees “conventional prepayment penalty”146 and 
up to two bona fide discount points, as explained in detail below.
3. Calculation of the Total Points and Fees Trigger
The federal Truth in Lending Act specifically mandates the 
disclosure of a loan’s annual percentage rate – a standardized form of 
interest rate calculation – to encourage loan price transparency and 
thereby provide consumers with a clearer understanding of the cost of a 
loan.147  The imposition of high points and fees, which appear almost 
invariably with subprime and all predatory loans, are far more confusing.  
Indeed, one of the persistent abuses in the home loan market have been 
lenders’ efforts to add charges to a loan that were not required by federal
law to be reflected in the loan’s APR.148  HOEPA and now HOSA 
attempt to set forth a comprehensive list of charges that must be included 
in calculating a loan’s points and fees and therefore possibly trigger 
classification as a Covered or High Cost Home Loan.  However, by 
including several items in the catalogue of charges that are specifically 
excluded from the HOEPA points and fees threshold calculation, HOSA 
will shift a greater proportion of Home Loans into its heavily regulated 
145 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Total Points And Fees Threshold”) (2003).  
For example, (and excluding up to two bona fide discount points), a $100,000 Home 
Loan would be a High Cost Home Loan if its points and fees were $5,000 or more; a 
$30,000 Home Loan would be a High Cost Home Loan if its points and fees were 
$1,800 or more; and a $18,000 Home Loan would be a High Cost Home Loan if its 
points and fees were $1,000 (that is, the lesser of $1,000 or 6% of the loan amount).
146 A “conventional prepayment penalty” is “any prepayment penalty or fee that 
may be collected or charged in a home loan, and that is authorized by law other than by 
this act, provided the home loan (1) does not have an annual percentage rate that 
exceeds the conventional mortgage rate by more than two percentage points; and (2) 
does not permit any prepayment fees or penalties that exceed two percent of the amount 
prepaid.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Conventional Prepayment Penalty”) (2003).
147 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (TILA’s purpose is to “assure a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit”); Schnall v. 
Amboy Nat. Bank, 279 F.3d 205, 219 (3rd Cir., 2002). Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) 
Nat. Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384, 389 (3rd Cir. 2002); see also TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 
__ at 33 (TILA is “Congress’s effort to guarantee the accurate and meaningful 
disclosure of the costs of consumer credit and thereby to enable consumers to make 
informed choices in the credit marketplace.”).
148 TRUTH IN LENDING, 2002 Supplement, supra note ___ at 209.  
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categories.  While HOSA’s exclusion of up to two “bona fide discount 
points” from the points and fees calculation appears to provide additional 
flexibility for lenders, the provision will most likely never affect the 
classification of High Cost Loans for reasons discussed below.149
149 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
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a) Calculation of Points and Fees 
Under the Act, the following charges must be included in 
calculating a loan’s Total Points and Fees Trigger: (1) all items, other 
than interest and a time price differential, listed in Section 1605(a)(1)-(4) 
of TILA, which includes all points, origination fees, service charges and 
other charges by the lender such as a loan fee, finder’s fee or 
investigation or credit report fee;150 (2) all closing-related costs 
specifically listed in Section 1605(e) of TILA;151 (3) all compensation 
paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker;152 (4) the cost of all 
premiums financed by the creditor, directly or indirectly, for any credit 
insurance;153 (5) the maximum loan prepayment fees and penalties that 
could be charged in connection with the loan and all prepayment fees or 
penalties actually that are actually incurred by a borrower if the loan is 
refinancing a previous loan held by the same creditor (or its affiliate).154
150 N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(3)(1) (2003).  Section 1605(a) lists items that must be 
included in HOEPA’s points and fees calculation.  HOSA incorporates into its 
definition of points and fees, the following items (excluding interest and the time price 
differential):  
(1) any amount payable under a point, discount, or other system or additional 
charges;
(2) service or carrying charge
(3) loan fee, finders fee, or similar charge
(4) fee for an investigation or credit report.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2003).
151 N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(3)(2) (2003).  Under Section 1605(e), these charges are 
actually excluded from HOEPA’s points and fees calculation.  Section 1605(e) reads as 
follows:
The following items, when charged in connection with any extension of credit 
secured by an interest in real property, shall not be included in the computation of the 
finance charge with respect to that transaction: 
(1) Fees or premiums for title examination, title insurance, or similar purposes.
(2) Fees for preparation of loan-related documents.
(3) Escrows for future payments of taxes and insurance.
(4) Fees for notarizing deeds and other documents.
(5) Appraisal fees, including fees related to any pest infestation or flood hazard 
inspections conducted prior to closing.
(6) Credit reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (2003).   HOSA treats the items listed in section 1605(e) in the 
opposite manner of TILA by including them in its points and fees calculation.  Section 
1605(e), like section 1605(a) references “credit reports,” making HOSA redundant in 
this small way.
152 N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(3)(3) (2003).  This provision would force lenders to reflect 
as a real cost to borrowers the indirect compensation paid to brokers by creditors that in 
the form of a yield spread premium.  Yield spread premiums tend to encourage brokers 
to charge borrowers a higher interest rate.  See text accompanying supra note __;  see 
also HOEPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4)(B) (2003) (requiring that “all compensation paid 
to mortgage brokers” be included in the total points and fees calculation).
153 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (2003).
154 N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(5),(6) (2003).  As discussed below, unlike other state 
predatory lending legislation and HOEPA itself, HOSA does not place any express 
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For the purposes of the Act, “Points and Fees” do not include the 
following: (1) title insurance premiums and fees;155 (2) taxes, filing fees, 
and recording and other charges paid to public officials for perfecting or 
satisfying a security interest; (3) certain “reasonable” fees paid to person 
unaffiliated156 with either the creditor or the mortgage broker,157 for tax 
payment services, flood certification, pest, flood, appraisal and 
inspection fees, attorney’s or notary’s fees, escrow charges158 and fire 
and flood insurance premiums, provided that such premiums are 
purchased from an entity that is not affiliated with the creditor or certain 
disclosures are made.159
Notably, HOSA’s definition of Points and Fees in places, is either 
moot, inconsistent or confusing.  First, the Act’s inclusion of financed 
premium insurance is rendered moot by Section 10B-25(4)(a) of the Act, 
which categorically prohibits the inclusion of any single premium credit 
insurance in the first place in any Home Loan.  No lender will ever 
calculate the cost of such insurance because no lender will be permitted 
to even charge for such a product.  Perhaps the New Jersey legislature 
relied too reflexively on the points and fees calculations set forth in 
HOEPA, which requires that charges for single premium credit insurance 
be calculated as part of the HOEPA points and fees trigger, see 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.32(b)(iv), but which does not otherwise prohibit the imposition of 
such insurance charges.  
Second, again by incorporating by reference portions of HOEPA, 
the Act creates an apparent inconsistency as to whether title insurance 
fees should be included in the Points and Fees calculation.  On the one 
hand, “Points and Fees” includes by reference to Section 1605(e)(1) of 
TILA, “fees or premiums for title examination, title insurance, or similar 
limitation on the imposition prepayment penalties on High Cost Home Loans.  See text 
accompanying infra notes __ to __.
155 N.J.SA. 46:10B-24(3)(“Points and Fees”).   As described below, this exclusion 
appears to contradict the inclusion of title insurance premiums in the points and fees 
calculation required elsewhere in the Act.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Points 
and Fees” (2)) (2003).
156 Affiliate is defined by the Act with reference to the definition set forth in 12 
U.S.C. § 1841 (“any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common 
control with another company”).  See N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Affiliate”) 
(2003).
157 These exclusions from “Points and Fees” incorporates “the conditions” in 12 
C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7) (2003), which are actually listed in 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1)(iii) 
(2003).
158 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __ regarding the Act’s ambiguous 
treatment of escrows.
159 These conditions relating to premiums have been incorporated from 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.4(d)(2) (2003).  N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Points and Fees”) (2003).  That 
regulation states that “(i) Insurance coverage may be obtained from a person of the 
consumer’s choice, and this fact is disclosed. (ii) If the coverage is obtained from or 
through the creditor, the premium for the initial term of insurance coverage shall be 
disclosed. If the term of insurance is less than the term of the transaction, the term of 
insurance shall also be disclosed.”  12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(2) (2003).
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purposes.”160  On the other hand, the Act expressly excludes from the 
definition of “Points and Fees,” “title insurance premiums and fees, 
charges and premiums paid to a person or entity holding an individual or 
organization insurance producer license in the line of title insurance or 
title insurance company, as defined by” New Jersey’s title insurance 
licensing law.161  Perhaps the best way to harmonize this apparent 
inconsistency is to read the former provision in this portion of the Act as 
broader than and inclusive of the latter; that is, the former category 
covers title fees paid to all parties, while the latter category covers title 
fees paid only to licensed title insurers.  Thus, by subtracting the smaller 
from the broader category, what remains and must be included in the 
definition of Points and Fees, is title fees to unlicensed title service 
providers.  For instance, traditional title insurance premiums, paid to a 
third-party provider, would be excluded from the definition, while any 
fees collected by a creditor in connection with title issues – such as some 
kind of referral fee – would be included. 
Finally, the Act creates some confusion about whether or in what 
form escrow charges should be included in the calculation of Points and 
Fees.  On the one hand, the Act includes escrows for future payments of 
taxes and insurance; on the other hand the same subsection of the Act 
excludes bona fide and reasonable escrow charges paid to a person other 
than a creditor or its affiliate or to the mortgage broker or its affiliate.  
Textually, those two sections seem to mean that escrows for future 
payments of taxes and insurance that are either (x) paid to the creditor, 
mortgage broker or one of their affiliates or (y) that are neither bona fide 
nor reasonable, are included in the definition of Points and Fees.
Although this appears to be the most coherent reading of the text, 
this treatment of escrows is inconsistent with standard lending practices 
in the prime market in which the retention of reasonable escrows is 
common.162  It would seem more consistent with the Act’s purposes if 
only those escrow charges that were in excess of reasonable escrowed 
taxes and fees and insurance premiums were included within the 
definition of Points and Fees.  Notwithstanding this, the inclusion of a 
reasonable escrow should only make up a very small portion of the 
Points and Fees and so, perhaps, their inclusion may have been 
purposeful.
b) Exceptions for Bona Fide Discount Points 
(“BFDP”)
In the conventional loan market, lenders frequently charge points 
in exchange for a lower loan interest rate than the borrower would 
160 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(1)
161 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Points and Fees”) (2003).
162 Indeed, the New Jersey Department of Banking has taken the position that 
such escrows are not included within the ambit of Points and Fees: N.J. Department of 
Banking and Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15 (7/25/03) at 7.
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otherwise receive.  Discount points most benefit borrowers who can 
recoup their initial point investment by paying the bargained for lower 
interest rate over a long period of time.  The Act recognizes the value of 
such an exchange by excluding from both the Covered Home Loan 
threshold or the High Cost Home Loan Points and Fees threshold, up to 
two “bona fide discount points.”  
According to the Act, in order for loan discount points to be 
“bona fide”, they must meet two criteria: (i) the interest rate on the loan 
that is being discounted, prior to the application to the discount points, 
must be at most two points above the conventional mortgage rate163 for 
first lien mortgages (and or at most three-and-a-half points for junior lien 
mortgages); and (ii) they must be knowingly paid by the borrower for the 
express purpose of, and in fact reducing, the loan’s interest rate; so that 
(iii) the borrower recovers an amount equal to such loan discount points 
within the first five years of the scheduled loan payments.164
Because High Cost Home Loans typically have interest rates that 
far exceed two points above the conventional mortgage rate, the bona 
fide discount point exclusion will have a relatively minor effect on that 
category of loans.  The exclusion may apply to the rare case of a loan 
that is classified as High Cost solely by virtue of its high points and fees 
structure, but that otherwise has an interest rate that is within two points 
of the conventional mortgage rate.165  The bona fide discount point 
exclusion will certainly have a greater impact on the Covered Home 
Loan category, because it will certainly prevent some Home Loans from 
-being classified as Covered Home Loans. 
B. Prohibitions
As described, the Act provides for the greatest amount of 
regulation for High Cost Home Loans based upon the valid assumption 
that those loans are the most likely to invite predatory practices.  The Act 
also prohibits loan flipping for Covered Home Loans (and the included 
163 Generally considered the average national mortgage rate, it is specifically 
defined by the Act as “the most recently published annual yield on conventional 
mortgages published by” the Federal Reserve Board.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) 
(“Conventional Mortgage Rate”) (2003).  For example, at around the time of the Act’s 
passage, the conventional mortgage rate was 4.88%.  See note __ [determining 
conventional mortgage rate above]
164 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Bona Fide Discount Points”) (2003).  The 
Act considers discount points to be recouped within the first five years if “the reduction 
in the interest rate that is achieved by the payment of the loan discount points reduces 
the interest charged on the scheduled payments such that the borrower's dollar amount 
of savings in interest over the first five years is equal to or exceeds the dollar amount of 
loan discount points paid by the borrower.” Id. Note, however, that this does not 
necessarily amount to an actual savings by the borrower because it fails to account for 
the time value of money.
165 It will certainly not be surprising, however, to see the subprime market 
develop low interest, high fee mortgage products as they adapt to the requirements of 
the Act.
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category of High Cost Home Loans), and certain additional economically 
unjustifiable practices for all Home Loans.
1. High-Cost Home Loans
While many of the following loan terms that are prohibited by the 
Act may have legitimate economic justification when employed in 
commercial or prime residential credit markets, the legislature appears to 
have taken the position that such terms are overwhelmingly predatory in 
the High Cost Home Loan market.
a) Balloon Payments
Typically, a balloon payment appears as a very large lump-sum 
payment that is due at the end of the term of a loan that has a schedule of 
periodic payments.166  The Act defines a balloon payment more 
expansively as any “scheduled payment that is more than twice as large 
as the average of earlier scheduled payments.” 167  Lenders claim balloon 
loans allow borrowers to obtain loans at lower monthly costs in 
anticipation of increased income or future refinancing at lower rates.168
If the income increase does not occur and interest rates do not drop, 
however, the borrower owes an enormous final payment that she often 
cannot pay.  In any event, the legislature seems to have taken the 
position that most balloon payments for subprime borrowers are 
predatory because it would be unlikely that the borrower could make the
balloon payment and may then be forced to refinance with the same 
creditor on disadvantageous terms.
b) Negative Amortization
The Act prohibits High Cost Home Loans in which “the 
outstanding principal balance will increase at any time over the course of 
the loan because the regular periodic payments do not cover the full 
amount of interest due.”169  Such a prohibition obviously bars those loans 
that are intended from the outset to be negative amortization loans.  But 
it also bars adjustable rate loans with capped monthly payments, even 
where rising interest rates would require higher monthly payments to 
ensure that the principal balance of the loan did not increase over time.  
As with balloon loans, lenders claim that negative amortization loans 
allow borrowers to obtain loans at lower monthly costs in anticipation of 
increased income or future refinancing at lower rates.170  Again, the 
166 See text accompanying infra note __.
167 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(4)(a) (2003).  This provision does not apply 
“when the payment schedule is adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the 
borrower.”  Id.
168 Fannie Mae, Taking the Mystery Out of Your Mortgage: What Desktop 
Underwriter Analyzes in Your Loan Application (2003) at 25.
169 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(b) (2003).
170 Fair Housing Administration, FHA Insured Loans, Calculating Graduated
Payment Mortgages, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/gpm/gpm_calc.cfm (last 
checked September 2, 2003).
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legislature seems to have taken the position that most negative 
amortization loans are predatory in the High Cost Home Loan arena.
c) Default Interest Rates
The Act bars the inclusion of provisions in High Cost Home 
Loans that allow the creditor to increase the interest rate on the loan after 
a borrower’s default.171  Lenders argue that such default interest rates 
encourage timely payment as the threat of higher interest rates will 
encourage borrowers to make their payments.  The legislature appears to 
have agreed with consumer advocates who have argued that such 
provisions make it impossible to cure a default once it has occurred and 
thus unnecessarily increases the risk of default and, ultimately, 
foreclosure.172
d) Prepaid Finance Charges
Prepaid finance charges generally refer to “any finance charge 
paid separately in cash or check before or at consummation of a 
transaction, or withheld from the proceeds of the credit at any time.”173
Prepayment provisions in the prime market are commonly employed to 
collect the interest due for the days from closing to the first scheduled 
monthly payment, which typically would not exceed the first thirty days’ 
interest due on the loan.174  The Act limits prepaid interest provisions in 
High Cost Home Loans by prohibiting creditors from retaining at closing 
any more than two periodic payments – for example, two months’ 
payments on a loan that is repaid on a monthly basis -- from the 
borrower’s loan proceeds.175
e) Access to Legal Remedies
The Act voids any provision in a High Cost Home Loan that 
either: (i) allows a party (such as the creditor) to require a borrower to 
assert any claim or defense in a forum that is less convenient, more 
costly, or more dilatory for the resolution of a dispute than the New 
Jersey courts or (ii) limits in any way any claim or defense the borrower 
may have.176  Moreover, a creditor making a High Cost Home Loan must 
use New Jersey foreclosure procedures.177
171 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(c) (2003).  This provision does not “apply to 
interest rate changes in a variable rate loan otherwise consistent with the provisions of 
the loan documents, provided the change in the interest rate is not triggered by the event 
of default or the acceleration of the indebtedness.”  Id.
172 TRUTH IN LENDING, 2002 Supplement, supra note __ at §10.4.3.
173 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(23) (2003); Regulation Z Official Staff Commentary § 
226(a)(23)-2.
174 Mortgage Terms Dictionary, at http://mortgage-
calculators.org/dictionary/dictionary.php3?lit=p.
175 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(d) (2003).
176 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(e) (2003).
177 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(k) (2003).  It is unclear whether the legislative 
intent of this section is to bar mandatory arbitration clauses.  Other state predatory 
lending legislation does bar such clauses, but it is not clear whether arbitration is “less 
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f) Mandatory Notice to Borrower
In addition to restrictions on creditor activities, the Act attempts 
to increase consumer understanding of the lending process.  The Act 
requires that creditors making High Cost Home Loans provide a notice 
to the borrower, at least three days prior to the loan closing,178 that, 
among other things, encourages the borrower to consult an attorney and 
"shop around" for the best deal on their loan.179  In addition, the notice 
convenient, more costly, or more dilatory” than the court system.  See, e.g., N.C. Stat. § 
24-1.1(e) (2003).
178 The Act incorporates the disclosure timing requirements of HOEPA contained 
in 12 C.F.R. § 226.31(c) (2003).
179 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(f) (2003).  The Act requires that the text of the notice 
be substantially in the following form:
NOTICE TO BORROWER
YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO 
OBTAIN A LOAN AT A LOWER COST. YOU SHOULD SHOP 
AROUND AND COMPARE LOAN RATES AND FEES. 
MORTGAGE LOAN RATES AND CLOSING COSTS AND FEES 
VARY BASED ON MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING YOUR 
PARTICULAR CREDIT AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, 
YOUR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, THE LOAN-TO-VALUE 
REQUESTED AND THE TYPE OF PROPERTY THAT WILL 
SECURE YOUR LOAN. THE LOAN RATE AND FEES COULD 
ALSO VARY BASED ON WHICH CREDITOR OR BROKER 
YOU SELECT.
IF YOU ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS LOAN, THE CREDITOR 
WILL HAVE A MORTGAGE LIEN ON YOUR HOME. YOU 
COULD LOSE YOUR HOME AND ANY MONEY YOU PUT 
INTO IT IF YOU DO NOT MEET YOUR PAYMENT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN.
YOU SHOULD CONSULT AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW AND A 
QUALIFIED INDEPENDENT CREDIT COUNSELOR OR OTHER 
EXPERIENCED FINANCIAL ADVISOR REGARDING THE 
RATE, FEES AND PROVISIONS OF THIS MORTGAGE LOAN 
BEFORE YOU PROCEED. A LIST OF QUALIFIED 
COUNSELORS IS AVAILABLE BY CONTACTING THE NEW 
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE.
YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS LOAN 
AGREEMENT MERELY BECAUSE YOU HAVE RECEIVED 
THIS DISCLOSURE OR HAVE SIGNED A LOAN 
APPLICATION.
REMEMBER, PROPERTY TAXES AND HOMEOWNER'S 
INSURANCE ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITY. NOT ALL 
CREDITORS PROVIDE ESCROW SERVICES FOR THESE 
PAYMENTS. YOU SHOULD ASK YOUR CREDITOR ABOUT 
THESE SERVICES.
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must warn the borrower that (i) by accepting the loan, the creditor will 
have a mortgage on her home and (ii) failure to make timely payments 
can lead to the loss of the borrower’s home.180  HOSA’s required 
disclosures are an important supplement to current federal home 
mortgagor protections both because the disclosures are more 
comprehensible and comprehensive than those required by TILA and 
because they are coupled, unlike as in TILA, with actual prohibitions on 
predatory behavior.
g) Mandatory Loan Counseling
Recognizing that many High Cost Home Loan borrowers are 
financially unsophisticated and unfamiliar with fundamental aspects of 
the consumer credit market, the Act attempts to channel prospective 
High Cost Home Loan borrowers who finance points and fees181 through 
independent non-profit loan counselors.182  Prior to consummating the 
loan, the creditor must obtain a certification that the borrower has 
received such counseling (or has completed some other substantial 
requirement) as to the advisability of the transaction.183  New Jersey 
currently has a number of established not-for-profits, such as Citizen 
Action, which provide such loan counseling.184
It is worth noting that by limiting required loan counseling to 
those whose High Cost Home Loans have financed points and fees – but 
not to say, High Cost Home Loans that simply have a very high APR –
the Legislature appears to offer the benefits of counseling only to those 
borrowers whose loans contain costs that are less transparent to 
borrowers.  Other High Cost Home Loan borrowers, however, would 
appear to also benefit from loan counseling, such as borrowers who are 
eligible for prime loans but who are about to enter into a High Cost 
Home Loan due to a lack of information about the consumer credit 
market.
ALSO, YOUR PAYMENTS ON EXISTING DEBTS 
CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR CREDIT RATINGS. YOU SHOULD 
NOT ACCEPT ANY ADVICE TO IGNORE YOUR REGULAR 
PAYMENTS TO YOUR EXISTING CREDITORS.
180 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(f) (2003).
181 Note that a High Cost Home Loan can finance at most two points.  N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(l) (2003).
182 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(g) (2003).  Such counseling must be given by a 
“third-party nonprofit credit counselor, approved by the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Banking and Insurance” 
regarding the “advisability of the loan transaction . . ..”  Id.
183 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(g) (2003).
184 See, e.g., Citizen Action Homepage, at  http://www.njcitizenaction.org/ (last 
checked August 29, 2003).
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h) Direct Payment to Home Improvement 
Contractors
Home improvement contractors frequently help generate 
predatory loans.  In many cases, an unscrupulous contractor will arrange 
financing for a home improvement loan with a pre-selected predatory 
lender, so as to be paid directly by the complicit lender at loan closing 
before the work is complete or capably done.185  Such a direct payment 
arrangement deprives a borrower of any leverage to control the quality or 
timeliness of a contractor’s work.  In response to this prevalent practice, 
the Act prohibits any of the proceeds from a High Cost Home Loan from 
being paid directly to a home improvement contractor.186
i) Loan Modification and Deferral Fees
A creditor shall not charge a borrower any fees to modify, renew, 
extend, or amend a High Cost Home Loan or to defer any payment due 
under the terms of a High Cost Home Loan.187  This provision, while 
facially similar to provisions limiting the costs of refinancing, appears to 
address changes to the non-monetary terms of a loan as well as 
unplanned contingencies that affect a borrower’s ability to make 
scheduled loan payments.188
For instance, if a creditor and borrower agree to any change in 
the terms of the High Cost Home Loan – as where a borrower wants to 
defer a few monthly payments during a period of unemployment – the 
creditor simply cannot charge any fees.189  It is unclear why the 
Legislature chose to categorically prohibit charges for such 
modifications – which would appear to dramatically reduce creditor 
incentive to agree to loan modifications – when some could be useful to 
a borrower if made available on reasonable terms.190
185 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
186 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(h) (2003).  The proceeds of a home-
improvement loan must be payable (i) to the borrower, (ii) jointly to the borrower and 
the contractor or (iii) at the election of the borrower, to a third-party escrow agent in 
accordance with a written agreement signed by the borrower, creditor and contractor 
prior to disbursement.  Id.
187 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(i) (2003).
188 Renewing a loan is borrowing a similar amount under the same terms as the 
previous loan after its payment term has expired. Refinancing is “paying off an existing 
loan with the proceeds from a new loan, usually of the same size, and using the same 
property as collateral.” Investorwords.com, at 
http://www.kiplinger.com/basics/glossary/#R  (ast checked September 2, 2003).  
Typically, borrowers refinance when they want “to reduce monthly payments or to 
modify interest charges.”  Id.
189 This prohibition does not prevent the creditor from capitalizing deferred 
interest.  Thus, if a borrower missed a payment, the creditor could add the missed 
interest to the principal balance due on the loan.  
190 Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(j) (2003) (limiting refinancing points and 
fees for High Cost Home Loans to two percent).
MODEL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
36
j) Same-Creditor Refinancings
The Act prohibits any creditor from flipping Covered Home 
Loans (which include all High Cost Home Loans) extended by that or 
any other creditor in certain circumstances.191  In addition, Section 5(j) 
of the Act bars a creditor from charging points and fees for a new High 
Cost Home Loan that refinances an existing High Cost Home Loan 
already owned by that same creditor.192  This additional prohibition 
seems to acknowledge that a creditor that refinances a loan that it already 
owns faces lower underwriting costs than a new creditor because it 
already has at least some underwriting data on and a payment history 
with that borrower.193
k) Limited Financings of Points and Fees
Under no circumstances may a creditor finance, directly or 
indirectly, points and fees for a High Cost Home Loan that are in excess 
of two percent of the total loan amount.194  This section, of course, does 
not bar the charging of more than two points to be paid in cash, but 
recognizes that the financing of points and fees represents a hidden cost 
to many subprime borrowers and frequently has the effect of stripping 
equity from their homes.195  This two point cap does allow cash-poor 
borrowers (e.g., those who do not have the cash to pay points and fees up 
front) to access the equity in their homes, but limits those points and fees 
to an amount that is more in line with those found in the prime market 
than in the high end of the subprime market.196
2. Covered Home Loans
As described, the Act’s intermediate classification of loans, 
Covered Home Loans, have a lower points and fees trigger than High 
Cost Home Loans and therefore includes a greater number of Home 
Loans within its regulatory scope.197  Covered Home Loans (which 
includes all High Cost Home Loans) have only one prohibition in 
addition to those that apply to all Home Loans.  This prohibition relates 
to the practice of “flipping” loans.198  Flipping generally refers to the 
practice of creditors repeatedly refinancing loans primarily as a way of 
191 See text accompanying infra notes __ - __.
192 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(j) (2003).  
193 Where the originating creditor still holds the note, this assumption would seem 
to be particularly valid as it could rely in part on its initial underwriting analysis.  This 
assumption might be less strong where the borrower seeks the refinancing from a 
creditor who purchased the loan on the secondary market.  Nonetheless, this provision 
applies to the secondary market purchaser as much as it does to the originator.
194 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(l) (2003).
195 See text accompanying note __.
196 See text accompanying note __(where they are charged, points and fees in 
prime market average __%).
197 See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.  
198 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b) (2003).
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extracting prepayment penalties, points and other costs.199  By 
prohibiting flipping in a broader segment of the residential mortgage 
market, the legislature appears to have concluded that flipping is a 
particularly abusive practice that inequitably strips equity from 
borrowers throughout a greater portion of the subprime market than just 
the High Cost Home Loan portion.
According to the Act, flipping occurs when: (i) a creditor makes a 
Covered Home Loan to a borrower; (ii) that refinances any existing 
home loan200 that was consummated within the prior 60 months; and (iii) 
that new loan does not have a “reasonable, tangible net benefit to the 
borrower.”201  The only elaboration offered by the Act to assess whether 
a loan provides such a benefit is to consider “all the circumstances, 
including the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the economic 
and noneconomic circumstances.”202  In response to industry concerns 
about the ambiguity of the “reasonable tangible net benefit” standard, the 
New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (“DOBI”) issued 
guidelines to assist lenders and presumably, courts interpreting the 
Act.203
199 See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.  
200 The Act specifically addresses whether a loan that was closed prior to the 
Act’s effective date of November 27, 2003 is deemed to be an existing home loan for 
the purposes of the Act’s flipping provisions.  The Act deems such a loan an “existing 
home loan” so long as it meets the Act’s definition of a Home Loan.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 
46:10B-35(15) (2003).
201 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b).
202 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b) (2003).
203 According to DOBI, “lenders should look at a range of factors related to an 
individual borrower’s
circumstances.” State of New Jersey Dep’t of Banking and Insurance 
Bulletin No. 03-15, July 25, 2003, at 10.  DOBI provides the 
following examples of factors that could be relevant to the reasonable 
tangible net benefit assessment:
• Terms of the new and old loan, including, but not limited to, 
note rate, amortization schedule, and balloon payment 
provisions, provided that costs associated with (and paid at or 
before closing of) the old loan, such as closing costs or points 
and fees other than prepayment penalties, are not normally 
relevant to the determination of flipping;
• Costs of the new loan, including points and fees charged on the 
new loan as well as other closing costs associated with the 
transaction as routinely disclosed on the closing statement;
• Loan-to-value ratio of the new loan compared to that 
associated with the outstanding balance on the existing home 
loan; 
• Debt-to-income ratio of the borrower before and after the 
proposed transaction;
• In cases where economic benefits do not demonstrably indicate 
that a reasonable, tangible net benefit has occurred, a 
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In addition, the Act specifies two additional circumstances in 
which any “home loan refinancing” is presumed to constitute illegal 
flipping:  (1) where the primary tangible benefit to the borrower is a 
lower interest rate on the “new loan” and where it will take more than 
four years for the borrower to recoup her closing costs through the 
interest rate savings; and (2) where the borrower will lose the benefits of 
a mortgage originated, subsidized or guaranteed by or through a state, 
tribal or local government, or nonprofit organization and where that 
mortgage had either (i) a below-market interest rate at the time of 
origination or (ii) beneficial non-standard payment terms such as 
payments that vary with income or are limited to a percentage of income 
or where no payments are required in certain circumstances.204
It appears from the plain language of these two additional types 
of flipping that they apply even if the new loan is merely a Home Loan 
and not a Covered Home Loan:  in describing these additional 
circumstances, it refers to a “home loan refinancing” and a “new loan” 
with no mention that the new loan be a Covered Home Loan.  This plain 
text reading of the Act would not be controversial other than for the fact 
that DOBI has taken the position that the Act only applies where the new 
loan is a Covered Home Loan.205  DOBI’s analysis, however, is 
inconsistent with the text of the Act.  The result of the textual reading of 
the Act is that all Home Loan refinancings must be reviewed to ensure 
that they do not fall within this broad definition of flipping.
3. All Home Loans206
The following are practices that are prohibited for all Home 
Loans – including Covered Home Loans and High Cost Home Loans.
a) Credit Insurance
HOSA prohibits creditors from financing any credit insurance 
along with all Home Loans.207  For the reasons already described, the 
packing of financed credit insurance premiums has become a huge 
financial boon to certain lenders without providing any reasonable 
benefit to – and, indeed, stripping substantial equity from – the 
significant reason that explains the need for, and proposed use 
of, the loan proceeds; and
• Other benefits the borrower receives from the transaction.
Id.  In addition, DOBI recommends that the lender “obtain an explanation from the 
borrower regarding any non-economic benefits the borrower associates with the loan 
transaction.  Id.
204 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b)(1)-(2) (2003).
205 Bulletin at 10.
206 This includes, as mentioned above, all Covered Home Loans and High Cost 
Home Loans.
207 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(a) (2003).  As previously described this 
provision of the Act renders Section 24(3), requiring the inclusion of the cost of 
financed credit insurance as part of the points and fees calculation.  See supra note __.  
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borrowers who are frequently deceived into accepting such insurance.208
The legislature apparently regarded the practice of financing credit 
insurance as so valueless, that they chose to prohibit it for all categories 
of Home Loans.  Borrowers can still elect credit insurance in which 
premiums are paid on a monthly installment basis, as long as those 
premiums are not financed into the loan amount.209
b) Encouraging Default
The Act prohibits creditors from encouraging default on existing 
debt through refinancing a Home Loan.210  When a prospective creditor 
encourages default, it unnecessarily puts the borrower at risk of 
foreclosure and destroys her credit rating.  This can easily make the 
borrower utterly dependent upon such creditor even if the terms being 
offered are severely disadvantageous given the borrower’s credit profile.  
The legislature recognized that this practice is so universally coercive 
and without legitimate economic that it banned the practice for all Home 
Loans.
c) Late Payment Fees
The Act also regulates late payment fees that creditors can charge 
in relation to all Home Loans in the following ways: (i) No late payment 
fee may be in excess of five percent of the amount of the payment past 
due;211 (ii) late fee payments may only be assessed for a payment past 
due for fifteen days or more;212 (iii) late fee payments cannot be charged 
more than once for the same late payment;213 (iv) no late fee payment 
may be imposed unless the creditor notifies the borrower within forty-
five days following the date the payment was due that a late payment fee 
had been imposed for a particular late payment;214 (v) the creditor shall 
208 See text accompanying supra  notes __ to __. 
209 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(a) (2003).  
210 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(c) (2003).
211 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(1) (2003).
212 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(2) (2003).
213 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(3) (2003). If a late payment fee is deducted 
from a payment made on the loan, and such deduction causes a subsequent default on a 
subsequent payment, no late payment fee may be imposed for such default. If a late 
payment fee has been once imposed with respect to a particular late payment, no such 
fee shall be imposed with respect to any future payment that would have been timely 
and sufficient, but for the previous default.  Id.
For example, a borrower owes a $1000 monthly payment to a creditor due on 
the first of each month. In April, the borrower pays $1000 on April 20 and misses the 
assigned due date by more than 15 days. The creditor assesses a $50.00 late payment 
fee for April. In May, the borrower pays $1000 on May 1st. The creditor cannot take 
$50.00 from the May payment, apply it to April’s late fee, and assess another late 
payment fee of $50.00 because the borrower paid only $950.00 toward May’s balance.  
Instead, and in effect, the borrower cannot pay off the entire loan until that $50 is also 
paid off, but otherwise the failure to pay the late payment fee will have no effect on the 
borrower.
214 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(4) (2003). No late payment fee may be 
collected from any borrower if the borrower informs the creditor that nonpayment of an 
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treat each and every payment as posted on the same date as it was 
received by the creditor, servicer, creditor's agent, or at the address 
provided to the borrower for making payments.215
d) Discretionary Loan Acceleration
Acceleration provisions are common in loan documents to allow 
a lender to demand payment of the total outstanding balance or demand 
additional collateral before the end of the term of the loan, upon material 
default by the borrower.  HOSA bans the utterly commercially 
unreasonable practice of accelerating a loan in the lender’s sole 
discretion.216  The Act plainly recognizes that a borrower should be able 
to rely upon a contractual payment schedule and not be subject to 
foreclosure upon a lender’s whim.
e) Payoff Letter
Where a borrower seeks information on a loan’s remaining 
payoff balance, the creditor must provide it within seven business days 
of the borrower’s request free of charge.217  This curbs the excessive fees 
that some lenders have taken to charging for such a simple request.
4. What HOSA Fails to Regulate 
HOSA is also notable for its failure to directly regulate two very 
common features of predatory loans previously described.  First, HOSA, 
unlike HOEPA, does not address the predatory practice of asset-based 
lending by in any way requiring lenders to consider a borrowers’ ability 
to repay a High Cost Home Loan.218  HOEPA currently prohibits lenders 
from extending credit without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay219
but only in cases where the lender engages in a “pattern or practice” of 
such activity.220  A requirement that a lender consider a borrower’s 
installment is in dispute and presents proof of payment within 45 days of receipt of the 
creditor's notice of the late fee.  From the text, it appears that the mere assertion of a 
dispute is sufficient for the borrower to avoid a late fee so long as the borrower makes 
the late payment in the time proscribed by the statute.
215 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(5) (2003).  It appears that the creditor must 
post a payment as received even if it sent to any address of the creditor, servicer or the 
creditor’s agent other than the one indicated for the making of payments.  This seems 
odd.
216 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(e) (2003).  This provision does not prohibit 
acceleration of the loan in good faith due to the borrower’s failure to abide by the 
material terms of the loan.  Id.
217 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(f) (2003).
218 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __ (describing lending without ability 
to repay as central component of many predatory loans).
219 HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit “based on the consumer’s 
collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’ 
current and expected income, current obligations, and employment.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1639(h).
220 Traditionally, the pattern or practice element of the prohibition has been a hard 
one for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring proof of several instances of prohibited conduct in 
short period of time.  Newton v. United Companies Financial Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 
444, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1998).  The recent amendments have loosened the requirement 
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ability to repay based on her income rather than the equity in their home, 
akin to provisions of a number of states addressing predatory lending,221
would have been an important supplement to HOEPA’s limited 
protections for New Jersey Home Loan borrowers.
Second, the Act does not directly regulate the common predatory 
practice of levying prepayment penalties on High Cost Home Loans.222
Virtually all of the states that have chosen to aggressively respond to the 
problem of predatory lending have either banned or substantially limited 
prepayment penalties that can be charged with High Cost Home 
Loans,223 and HOEPA bans the practice under certain circumstances.224
Although High Cost Home Loan borrowers in New Jersey may have 
benefited from a direct limitation on prepayment penalties, perhaps in 
the form of a prohibition on such fees after a period of years from 
origination had elapsed, HOSA does indirectly regulate impositions of 
such penalties.  If prepayment penalties are to be assessed against a High 
Cost Home Loan, they cannot be imposed by a creditor refinancing a 
loan already held by that creditor.225
C. Liability Under The Act
The liability provisions of the Act are somewhat complex but 
allow for substantial damages against creditors who violate them.  
somewhat, creating a presumptive violation where the lender has failed to document 
and verify the borrower’s ability to pay.  The amended rule seeks to strengthen 
HOEPA's prohibition on making loans based on homeowners' equity without regard to 
repayment ability. It “creates a presumption that a creditor has violated the statutory 
prohibition on engaging in a pattern or practice of making HOEPA loans without regard 
to repayment ability if the creditor generally does not verify and document consumers' 
repayment ability.” 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, 65606 (Dec. 21, 2001). 
221 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§24-1.1E (7)(c)(2) (prohibiting lending without 
considering borrower’s ability to repay, but presuming such ability exists if monthly 
debt-to-income ratio is 50 percent or lower); MASS. REGS CODE TIT. 209 § 32.00 (5)(a) 
(same); CAL. FIN. § 4931(f)(1) (same prohibition but setting ratio at 55%); 2003 ARK. 
ACTS § 2598(k)(1) (requiring lenders to evaluate borrower’s ability to repay but setting 
no percentage of debt-to-income ratio that would presumptively establish such ability).  
222 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __ (discussing ways in which 
prepayment penalties can be abusive when made in connection with high cost loans).
223 See, e.g., 2003 ARK. ACTS (3)(m) (prohibiting financing of prepayment fees or 
penalties); CAL FIN. § 4970(a)(1) (limiting or barring prepayment fees depending 
proximity to closing date); 1 GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5 (1)(A)(B) (limiting or barring 
prepayment fees depending on proximity to closing date); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E 
(c)(3)(a) (prohibiting all prepayment penalties).
224 Specifically, HOEPA prohibits the imposition of prepayment penalties unless 
the creditor can demonstrate that: (1) the loan will not cause the borrower to pay more 
than 50% of gross monthly income toward “monthly indebtedness payments”; (2) the 
borrower’s income and expense are verified by a financial statement signed by the 
borrower and by a credit report; (3) the creditor is not refinancing either it’s own or an 
affiliate’s loan; (4) it is imposed only during the first five years of the law; (5) the 
prepayment penalty is otherwise legal under state law.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1639(c)(2)(a)-(d).
225 See text accompanying supra notes __ to __ (discussing prohibition contained 
in N.J. STAT. ANN. 10B-
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Notably, New Jersey is now one of only a handful of states that has 
extended liability broadly to assignees of certain Home Loans. 226
Indeed, the scope of the Act’s assignee liability provisions are broad 
enough to alter the dynamic of secondary market financing of High Cost 
Home Loans.  As a result, the Act’s assignee liability provisions are 
likely to dry up much of the funding for predatory loans in New Jersey.
1. Creditor Liability
Section 8 of the Act provides for both damages and equitable 
relief against creditors who violate the Act’s provisions.  First, a 
violation of the Act is deemed a per se violation of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act.227  Accordingly, a borrower may elect to seek 
damages under either, but not both: (i) the Consumer Fraud Act, which 
mandates treble damages – itself a strong remedy – and attorneys fees,228
or: (ii) the Act, which provides for statutory damages for material 
violations equal to all finance charges agreed to in the Home Loan 
agreement, plus up to 10% of the amount financed.229  In addition to this 
election, a borrower may be entitled to recover punitive damages for 
egregious violations, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.230  The 
structure of this damages election, which requires borrowers to choose 
between the Consumer Fraud Act’s treble damages provision or the 
Act’s statutory damages and then authorizes punitive damages on top of 
this election, gives the Act one of the strongest consumer protection
remedies in New Jersey.  
Second, the Act authorizes broad equitable relief.231  Thus, 
borrowers may, in addition to seeking damages, assert violations of the 
Act as a defense to a creditor’s foreclosure.  Where creditors commit 
material violations, borrowers may thereby be entitled to extinguish their 
entire obligation under the predatory loan.232
226 See, e.g., 2003 N.M. Laws Ch. 436; 2001 N.Y. Laws 11856.
227 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(a) (2003).
228 N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-19 (in a Consumer Fraud Act action “the court shall, in 
addition to any other appropriate legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages 
sustained by any person in interest. In all actions under this section, including those 
brought by the Attorney General, the court shall also award reasonable attorneys' fees, 
filing fees and reasonable costs of suit.”).
229 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(a), (b)(1) (2003).
230 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(b)(1)(b)-(c) (2003).   Importantly, the Act 
expressly states that its penalty provisions are cumulative, not exclusive of, other 
remedies a borrower may have.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-30 (2003).  Borrowers may 
therefore still assert causes of action under TILA, HOEPA, the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures, Act, common law fraud and unconscionability doctrines and the like.
231 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(b)(2) (2003).  
232 The Act also contains a catch-all and somewhat ambiguous provision that 
makes it a violation of the act to, in bad faith, circumvent the application of the Act by 
either (i) dividing a loan transaction into separate parts or (ii) using any other 
subterfuge with the intent to evade the Act.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).  
The catch-all provision appears to reflect the legislature’s concern that it has not 
anticipated every possible method of engaging in abusive lending practices.  Cf. Eric 
MODEL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
43
However, there appear to be two provisions of the Act that may 
impose caps on damages that are inconsistent with this general creditor 
liability provision and that are made all the more peculiar because of 
their placement in unrelated sections of the Act.  First, Section 6(a) of 
the Act, which predominantly deals with assignee liability 
considerations, imposes a damages cap of (i) the amount already paid on 
the loan, (ii) remaining liability, plus (iii) costs and attorney’s fees, for 
actions against manufactured home loan and home improvement loan 
creditors who have worked in tandem on the borrower’s loan with the 
seller of the manufactured home or home improvements (“Sales and 
Services Creditors”).233  Perhaps the best way of reconciling this 
apparent inconsistency is to construe the specific Section 6(a) provision 
as a cap on damages only as against the narrow category Sales and 
Services Creditors.  Borrowers would be entitled to pursue the broader 
range of damages under Section 8 against all other creditors.234
Second, Section 6(c) appears to impose a damages cap for 
Covered Home Loans and High Cost Home Loans that is inconsistent 
with the Act’s general liability provisions.  Section 6(c) limits damages 
against a Covered Home Loan or a High Cost Home Loan creditor, along 
with the assignees of such a loan, to (i) a borrower’s remaining 
obligation under the loan plus (ii) costs and attorney’s fees.235  While this 
additional reference to creditor liability, in a section of the Act that deals 
primarily with assignee liability, may be a drafting error, the plain 
language appears to impose a cap on damages against Covered Home 
Loan and High Cost Home Loan creditors that is typically less than the 
damages provided for in the general liability section of the Act.  Perhaps 
the best way to make sense at least of the High Cost Home Loan 
damages cap in Section 6(c) is to read that section as a damages cap that 
applies when actions are brought after the Act’s default six-year statute 
of limitations period.  There appears to be no comparable way to make 
sense of the apparent Covered Home Loan; however, one could read the 
apparently inconsistent provisions as offering borrowers a choice to sue 
Posner and Richard Haynes, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. 
LAW AND ECON. REV. 162 (2003) (arguing that much consumer protection legislation is 
rendered ineffective by their targets’ ability to circumvent black letter prohibitions).  
The provision appears to be directed against secondary market players, see, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 10B-27(6)(e) (2003), so it is likely that this provision of the Act is intended to 
prevent the secondary market from structuring residential mortgage backed securities 
pools so that they separate the flow of income from New Jersey Home Loans from the 
potential liability that might accrue from such loans that violate the Act.
233 N.J. STAT. ANN. 10B-27(6)(a) (2003).
234 An alternative reading would authorize borrowers to choose to sue the 
subcategory of Sales and Services Creditors for damages under either the Consumer 
Fraud Act, Section 8(b)’s statutory damages provisions, or Section 6(a)’s recoupment 
provision, whichever is the greater.
235 N.J. STAT. ANN. 10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
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under the provision that awards the greater damages or even as offering 
borrowers cumulative remedies. 236
2. Assignee Liability
The Act includes an express assignee liability provision in order 
to partially abrogate the scope of the holder-in-due-course doctrine, and 
thereby increase the reach of the Act’s remedies and defenses.  As 
previously described, the holder-in-due-course doctrine frequently 
imposes a substantial impediment to borrowers who seek redress for 
their predatory loans because it shields good faith purchasers and 
assignees of those loans from liability for even the most outrageous 
conduct by the originating creditors.237  Because many predatory lenders 
depend for their financing on the securitization of their mortgage pools 
and subsequent sale on the secondary markets,238 the Act’s assignee 
liability provisions are meant to dry up resources available to originators 
of those loans that violate the Act.  The assignee liability provisions, like 
the Act’s prohibitions themselves, depend upon how the loan is 
classified.  
a) High Cost Home Loans
Two provisions regulate assignee liability for High Cost Home 
Loans.  Each of these provisions is governed by a different statute of 
limitations.  The first provision allows a borrower to assert any and all 
affirmative claims for damages – including the damages election 
described above – or defenses that she may have against the original 
High Cost Home Loan creditor.239  As such, this assignee liability 
provision is a complete abrogation of the holder in due course doctrine 
for High Cost Home Loans.  A borrower of a High Cost Home Loan can, 
therefore assert any affirmative claim for damages available under 
Section 8 of the Act, including damages under the Consumer Fraud Act 
or statutory damages, as well as any available claims or defenses, 
including strong defenses to foreclosure, equally against both the creditor 
and the subsequent purchaser.  
While this abrogation of the holder-in-due-course doctrine is 
sweeping, the Act does provide certain safe harbors for those assignees 
that did not intend to invest in High Cost Home Loans, if the purchaser 
or assignee can demonstrate that, employing “reasonable due diligence,” 
236 In other words, this reading might allow a borrower in certain circumstances to 
sue for the Consumer Fraud Act and statutory damages election provided for in Section 
8(a) and the applicable Section 6 provision.  See Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s 
Addresses new Jersey Predatory Lending Law, May 2, 2003, available at 
www.standardandpoors.com.
237 See text accompanying supra  notes __ to __.
238 See text accompanying supra  notes __ to __.
239 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(b) (2003) (purchaser or assignee of a High-
Cost Home Loan is “subject to all affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to 
the loan that the borrower could assert against the original creditor or broker of the loan 
. . ..”).
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it could not have determined that the purchased loan was a High Cost 
Home Loan.”240  These safe harbors provide a variety of simple and low-
cost ways for assignees and purchasers to preserve traditional holder-in-
due-course defenses for High Cost Home Loans that they inadvertently 
purchase.  But for those who fail to comply with the safe harbor 
provisions or who intend to invest in High Cost Home Loans, the Act 
does abrogate the holder-in-due-course rule and subjects them to all 
claims and defenses available against creditors.  In order to avoid 
liability, therefore, the secondary market will either attempt to stop 
purchasing High Cost Home Loans altogether by complying with the 
safe harbor provision or undertake the due diligence required to purchase 
only those High Cost Home Loans that do not violate any of the Act’s 
provisions.
The second assignee liability provision applies even where an 
assignee meets the criteria entitling it to the protections of the Act’s safe 
harbor provisions, but limits potential damages.  Specifically, damages 
against all holders of High Cost Home Loans, even those that fall within 
240 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(b) (2003).  The Act sets forth a basis for a 
purchaser or assignee to be given a presumption that it has exercised such due 
diligence, if it can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it: 
(1) has in place at the time of the purchase or assignment of the 
loan, policies that expressly prohibit its purchase or 
acceptance of assignment of any high-cost home loan; 
(2) requires by contract that a seller or assignor of home loans to 
the purchaser or assignee represents and warrants to the 
purchaser or assignee that either 
(a) it will not sell or assign any high-cost home loan to the 
purchaser or assignee or 
(b) that the seller or assignor is a beneficiary of a 
representation and warranty from a previous seller or 
assignor to that effect; and 
(3) exercises reasonable due diligence at the time of purchase or assignment of 
home loans or within a reasonable period of time thereafter intended by the purchaser 
or assignee to prevent the purchaser or assignee from purchasing or taking assignment 
of any High Cost Home Loan.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(b) (2003).  The Act does not specifically define 
“reasonable due diligence.”  DOBI has taken the position that reasonable due diligence 
does not typically require an assignee to review every loan being purchased.  Bulletin at 
8 (“The Department considered the concept of “reasonable due diligence” as generally 
understood by courts, which is `what a reasonable person would have done in his 
situation given the same information.’ The Department is in the process of reviewing 
common banking and secondary market practices regarding due diligence review of 
mortgage pools, as well as similar due diligence in the securities context, and believes, 
based on the information it has obtained to date, that sampling is a standard accepted 
practice.
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the assignee safe harbor provision, are limited to the borrower’s 
remaining obligation under the loan plus costs and attorney’s fees.241
This second assignee liability specifically authorizes such claims 
to be brought by the borrower at any time during the term of the loan.242
The Act otherwise specifies no statute of limitations for any other 
provisions governing High Cost Home Loans.  Accordingly, New 
Jersey’s default statute of limitations period for tort actions, would 
appear to apply to all other High Cost Home Loan actions brought under 
other sections of the Act.243
b) Covered Home Loans
The Act provides for assignee liability for Covered Home Loans, 
but authorizes less damages than may be available against assignees of 
High Cost Home Loans .  Specifically, Section 6(c) provides that a 
borrower suing in an individual capacity and within six years of the 
loan’s closing, may assert a violation of the Act against a creditor or any 
assignee of a Covered Home Loan to recover the remaining obligation 
under the loan, plus costs and attorney’s fees.244  While it is important to 
have provided borrowers with a strong defense to foreclosure actions 
brought by assignees of Covered Home Loans, this liability is 
extinguished after merely six years.
c) Home Loans
The Act’s assignee liability provisions are more limited for Home 
Loans, applying only to those made in connection with a manufactured 
home or home improvement contract and offering slightly limited 
damages.  Accordingly, if a Home Loan “was made, arranged, or 
assigned by a person selling either a manufactured home, or home 
improvements to the dwelling of a borrower, or was made by or through 
a creditor to whom the borrower was referred by such seller, the 
borrower may assert all affirmative claims and any defenses that the 
borrower may have against the seller or home-improvement contractor . . 
. .”
245
  That is, if either a manufactured home seller or a home 
improvement contractor is working in tandem with a creditor, the 
borrower may assert any claims or defenses it has against the former in 
an action brought against (or brought by) the ultimate holder of the 
loan.246
241 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
242 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
243 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-2__ (2003)
244 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
245 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(a) (2003).
246 Although the Act does not address how much involvement a home 
improvement contractor or manufactured home seller must have in arranging a home 
loan for N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(a) to be apply, DOBI has taken the position that 
The requisite level of involvement will be reached if the contractor or 
seller is sufficiently involved in making or otherwise participating in 
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Damages available against creditors, holders or assignees in such 
cases are limited “to amounts required to reduce or extinguish the 
borrower's liability under the Home Loan, plus the total amount paid by 
the borrower in connection with the transaction, plus amounts required to 
recover costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.”247  While on its face, 
this limitation would prevent recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act’s 
treble damages provision, damages in the form of the “total amount paid 
by the borrower” in connection with the loan, plus reasonable attorneys 
fees could otherwise be substantial.248
3. Defenses
Creditors acting in good faith who fail to comply with the Act 
may escape liability under of the Act if the creditor: (i) within forty-five 
days of the loan closing, makes restitution to the borrower and 
appropriately adjusts the loan; or (ii) within 90 days of the loan closing 
and prior to receiving any notice from the borrower of the compliance 
failure, notifies and makes restitution to the borrower and appropriately 
adjusts the loan.249  The latter defense is available only where the 
compliance failure was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error, 
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to 
the home loan as consistent with the substantial guidance and 
precedent that underlies the FTC Holder Rule. For example, the 
circumstances in which a home improvement contractor will be 
determined to have “referred” a borrower to a lender under N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 46:10B-27a, will include "those situations where a [home 
repair] seller, in the ordinary course of business, is sending his buyers 
to a particular loan outlet, or to particular outlets, for credit which is 
to be used in the sellers’ establishment. In such circumstances, the 
seller is effectively arranging credit for his customers.”
N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance, Bulletin No. 03-15, at 5-6 (July 25, 2003) 
(internal citations omitted). 
247 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(a) (2003).
248 The statute of limitations provisions under the Act appear almost Byzantine.  
They are best understood by recognizing that HOSA is enacted into the background 
New Jersey statute of limitations provisions.  For all tort violations that do not have an 
explicit statute of limitations provision, which category includes some HOSA 
violations, the New Jersey statute of limitations is six years.  Cite.  Therefore, unless 
otherwise specified by the Act, all violations under the Act seeking the type of damages 
described are subject to a six year statute of limitations.  However, High Cost Home 
Loan borrowers asserting causes of action and/or defenses, brought in an individual 
capacity only, that seek equitable relief in the form of recoupment – an amount 
“required to reduce or extinguish the borrower’s liability under the home loan” – or 
similar defenses to foreclosure, can assert them at any time.
249 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(c) (2003).  The Act preempts all municipality, 
county or political subdivision ordinances, resolutions, or any other rules or regulations 
related to home loan lending practices.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-34(13) (2003).  The 
lending industry regarded this inclusion of this preemption clause as a significant 
victory as, they argued, multiple layers of regulation adds to lenders’ compliance costs 
and increases the risk of unintentional statutory violations.  See, e.g., MBANJ Backs 
Compromise, Origination News, April 2003.
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avoid such errors.250  This provision encourages creditors to conduct 
post-closing due diligence and correct unintentional violations of the 
Act.
III. EVALUATING THE ACT’S EFFECTIVENESS
Throughout the period of the Act’s consideration in the New 
Jersey legislature and lingering still, are important concerns about the 
Act’s effectiveness.  Those concerns, which we identify and comment on 
here, are first, whether the Act’s provisions will have the unintended and 
harmful consequence of drying out legitimate, desired subprime credit; 
and second, whether the Act’s assignee liability provisions will cause 
leading bond rating agencies to refuse to rate securitized mortgages and 
consequently end subprime mortgage financing by the secondary 
mortgage markets in New Jersey.
A. The Continued Availability Of Subprime Credit In New Jersey
A persistent objection leveled against HOSA and other, similar 
efforts to regulate high cost loans is that they are ultimately
counterproductive – that is, that such regulations will make it both so 
risky and costly to make high cost loans that most subprime lenders 
would abandon subprime lending entirely, leaving traditional subprime 
borrowers without any access to home equity credit.251  This objection, 
however, appears to be largely overstated.  Based on our understanding 
of the dynamics of the subprime lending market and the experience of 
other states, we predict that HOSA will dry up many predatory, high cost 
loans while leaving an ample supply of subprime credit available for this 
still lucrative market.252  Indeed, it may be that the Act does not go far 
enough: HOSA’s high cost loan triggers could have been set even lower 
to bring in a greater proportion of loans into its regulatory scope without 
causing material harm to legitimate subprime lending.  
First, a central premise of the concern over the Act’s possible 
undermining of legitimate subprime lending – that the higher costs 
250 N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(c) (2003).  Examples of bona fide errors 
include “clerical, calculation, computer malfunction and programming, and printing 
errors. An error of legal judgment with respect to a person's obligations under this 
section is not a bona fide error.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(c) (2003).
251 See, e.g., Kelly K. Spors, Republican Bill Aims to Mute State Laws on 
Subprime Loans, WALL STREET JOURNAL, February 14, 2003, at A4 (“The subprime-
lending industry complains that local regulation is confusing and counterproductive. 
For example, legislation enacted in Georgia makes anyone who winds up owning the 
loans -- including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- liable for lending violations. As a 
result, Fannie and Freddie have stopped buying some loans made in Georgia. Standard 
& Poor's and Moody's Investors Service have said they will no longer rate mortgage-
backed securities that include loans covered by the law, and some subprime lenders say 
they have pulled certain products out of the market there.”).
252 Cf. HUD-Treasury Report, supra note __ at 108 ("If the secondary market 
refuses to purchase loans that carry abusive terms, or loans originated by lenders 
engaging in abusive practices, the primary market may react to the resulting lack of 
liquidity by ceasing to make these loans").
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associated with making subprime loans under HOSA will make their 
extension unprofitable – appears flawed.  As an initial matter, HOSA’s 
High Cost Home Loan APR trigger – eight percent above the prevailing 
Treasury rate – is still very high.  Nationally, subprime loans have 
interest rates that average 2.5 - 4% above prime mortgage rates.253  Thus, 
HOSA’s High Cost Home Loan prohibitions will affect only a relatively 
small proportion of the subprime lending market and at rates that are 
already high.254
In addition, as we have highlighted elsewhere, studies of the 
subprime market demonstrate a highly imperfect correlation between a 
borrower’s credit risk and mortgage pricing, which would suggest a 
significant range of subprime lending profitability at rates below 
HOSA’s High Cost Home Loan triggers.255  Underwriting standards 
among different subprime lenders vary greatly, as do underwriting 
standards within a particular lending entity over time.256  In part as a 
result, and very much unlike the prime market, the range of pricing of 
subprime loans varies so greatly – between 3% and 19.99% in 1999 
according to one study257 – that subprime lending rates cannot 
consistently or accurately account for legitimate credit risk variations 
and very likely reflect a strong bias toward overpricing.258
Indeed, studies by both Government Sponsored Entities and the 
subprime industry itself, demonstrate that a substantial proportion of 
subprime borrowers are currently highly overcharged for their 
mortgages.  The Chairman of Fannie Mae estimated in 2000 that 
approximately fifty percent of all subprime borrowers could have 
qualified for a lower cost, prime loan based on their credit risk.259  A 
1996 industry sponsored poll of fifty of the then-most active subprime 
lenders came to a similar conclusion.260  Accordingly, even if HOSA 
eliminates a majority of high cost loans in New Jersey, legitimate 
253 See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.
254 Studies considering the effects of HOEPA estimate that lowering the trigger 
two points from ten to eight percent will cover an increase of only 5% or 3% of loans.  
HUD-Treasury Report, supra note __ at 66.
255 See Baher Azmy and David J. Reiss, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) at __.  
256 See WEICHER, supra note ___ at 34-35 (describing the substantial variety of 
underwriting criteria among subprime lending entities and within individual firms over 
time, which can result in large discrepancies in pricing to similarly-situated borrowers).
257 See Mansfield, supra note __ at 536.  In contrast, prime loans around that 
period fell into a range of under two percent.  Id.
258 Mansfield, supra note __ at 540 (“it is not clear that pricing in the subprime 
market has any basis at all….  Lenders will not calibrate price to risk when they can just 
as easily charge whatever rate they choose.”).  One study estimated that charging 
interest rates higher than justified by a borrower’s credit risk costs American borrowers 
$2.9 billion annually.  COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 9-10.
259 Freddie Mac Special Report on Automated Underwriting, September 1996, at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/mosely/chap5.htm. 
260 Inside B&C Lending, June 10, 1996 at __ 
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subprime lenders and even prime lenders will find a large, profitable 
range in which they would be willing to extend credit to traditional 
subprime borrowers.  Indeed, the above-analysis suggests that pricing of 
subprime lending is sometimes so highly uncorrelated to credit risk and 
biased upward, that HOSA APR triggers could be set even lower without 
jeopardizing the provision of subprime credit in New Jersey. 261
Second, the experience of other states that have enacted similar 
high cost loan regulations demonstrates that HOSA’s attempts to 
diminish abusive lending practices will not also deplete legitimate 
subprime lending.  In 1999, North Carolina became the first state to 
enact a comprehensive law to address predatory lending abuses in the 
residential mortgage market.262  The North Carolina law is substantially 
similar to New Jersey’s, by prohibiting loan terms and practices in 
connection with high cost loans – which North Carolina defined at ten 
percent higher than comparable Treasury rate and points and fees in 
excess of five percent of the total loan amount.263  The North Carolina 
act prohibits, among many other things, financing of any points or fees, 
balloon payments, negative amortizations, loan flipping without 
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower, prepayment penalties, 
and lending without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.264
Recent studies undertaken to evaluate the impact of the law on 
North Carolina’s residential mortgage market demonstrates that the law 
operated almost exactly as intended.265  These studies concluded that 
loan originations with predatory features decreased substantially in the 
state after the law’s enactment,266 but did not materially decrease either 
the supply of subprime credit to low income borrowers or the diversity of 
261 Cf. Fed Reserve Board Commentary on Proposed Amendments to Regulation 
Z, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“Data submitted by a trade association 
representing nondepository institution lenders suggest that there is an active market for 
HOEPA loans under the current APR trigger.  There is no evidence that the impact on 
credit availability will be significant if the trigger is lowered”).
262 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A
263 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A (6)(b)
264 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1.1A(7)(c)(2)
265 See ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITALISM, 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, THE IMPACT OF NORTH 
CAROLINA’S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT, June 25, 
2003; KEITH ERNST, ET AL., CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NORTH CAROLINA’S 
SUBPRIME HOME LOAN MARKET AFTER PREDATORY LENDING REFORM, August 13, 
2002.
266 See QUERCIA, supra note __ at 18-20 and tbls. 11-13 (documenting North 
Carolina’s comparative decrease in loans containing prepayment penalties, balloon 
payments and exceedingly high loan-to-value ratios); ERNST, supra note __ at 8-9 
(documenting post-enactment decrease in flipped loans without reasonable, tangible net 
benefit to the borrower of 7%, decrease in “excess fees” of 25%, decrease in single 
premium credit insurance of 20%, decrease in incidence of loans with prepayment 
penalties of 35%, and estimating that law saved North Carolina homeowners a total of 
$100 million).
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subprime mortgage products traditionally extended to them.267  The 
results of the North Carolina studies suggest that subprime borrowers in 
New Jersey will enjoy the predicted benefits of HOSA – a significant 
decrease in the number of high cost loans with predatory terms – at the 
same time the subprime lending in New Jersey will still meet the needs 
of New Jersey’s low-income borrowers.
B. The Negative (Over)Reaction Of The Secondary Market To 
HOSA
As previously described, lenders frequently pool together many 
of their mortgages, and through structured finance transactions organized 
by investment banks, securitize the mortgages and sell them to a variety 
of investors on the secondary market. 268  This process of securitization 
has in large part driven the dramatic rise of subprime lending in the past 
decade. 269  Prior to their sale, the secondary market demands that such 
transactions be rated by one or more of the major bond and securities 
rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (“S&P”), Fitch, 
Inc. (“Fitch”) and Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) – to 
identify the level of risk associated with the pool. 270  The role of such 
agencies is essential to the operation of the entire subprime mortgage 
pipeline; indeed, without such a rating from at least one of these 
agencies, most investors on the secondary market will not buy into a 
mortgage pool.271
267 See QUERCIA, supra note ___ at 12-21 (concluding that subprime lending 
market in North Carolina still large and vibrant after law’s enactment, that substantial 
portion of the limited decrease in subprime lending is attributable to decrease in 
predatory loans, and that subprime purchase loans actually increased after law’s 
passage); ERNST, supra note __ at 3-7 (concluding that subprime market in North 
Carolina still very strong after act’s passage, that proportion of subprime lending to 
lowest-income borrowers actually increased, and that there has been no increase in the 
pricing in subprime loans that might have been associated with a decrease in loan 
availability).  See also KEITH D. HARVEY AND PETER J. NEGRO, DO PREDATORY 
LENDING LAWS INFLUENCE MORTGAGE LENDING? AN ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH 
CAROLINA PREDATORY LENDING LAW, September 2002 (attributing limited decline of 
subprime lending in North Carolina to decrease in loan application rates, not loan denial 
rates); Inside B&C Lending, March 5, 2001 (reporting that North Carolina lenders 
offering full range of mortgage products after law’s enactment and that there was “little 
or no variation” in the pricing of those products as compared with other, neighboring 
states).  
268 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
269 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. 
270 See Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard and 
Poor’s Explains its Approach, April 15, 2003, at: http://www.housing 
choice.org/news%20stories/04152003.htm; Moody’s Investor Services, Inc., Moody’s 
Reports on Impact of Predatory Lending Laws in RMBS, March 26, 2003, at 
http://www.moodys.com; see also KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.18
271 KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
§ 1.18; see also Jonathan Fuerbringer, Agencies to Continue to Rate Pools of New York 
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES at C4 (Mar. 1, 2003).
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Recently, after Georgia passed a predatory lending law that 
contained a broad assignee liability provision applicable to those loans 
designated under that statute as high cost, the major rating agencies 
actually refused to rate residential mortgage-backed securities pools 
containing any loans that originated in Georgia after the effective date of 
the law. 272  The Georgia law authorized the borrower to assert against 
the assignee of a high cost home loan any and all claims the borrower 
could have asserted against a creditor but, unlike HOSA, failed to 
precisely define the differences among the various categories of 
regulated loans and provided no safe harbor protection for assignees who 
inadvertently purchased Georgia high cost loans despite having 
reasonable procedures in place to prevent such purchases. 273
The rating agencies concluded that Georgia’s assignee liability 
provisions created potentially unlimited damages for purchasers of high 
cost loans and were thus so risky that they could not be rated.274  The 
agencies’ announcement caused turmoil among Georgia lenders and 
signaled the imminent abandonment of financing for residential lending 
in the state. 275  Soon after, the Georgia legislature amended the statute in 
an attempt to address the rating agency concerns; specifically, the 
amended law clarified the distinction between high cost and other loans
272 See Standard and Poor’s Press Release, Standard and Poor’s to Disallow 
Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans, Jan. 16, 2003, available at: 
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/016b.pdf; Moody’s Investor Services Press 
Release, Moodys Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential 
Mortgages in Securitizations, Jan. 30, 2003, available at: 
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/0130a.pdf; Fitch Ratings Press Release, Fitch 
Ratins Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS Pools, Considers Impact to Other 
Predatory Lending Legislation; Feb. 5, 2003, 
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/0205b.html.  The credit analysis performed by the 
rating agencies determine if any of the underlying loans covered by a predatory lending 
statute may be included in its rating transactions and what, if any, additional credit 
enhancements may be required.  In performing an analysis of structured transactions 
backed by residential mortgage loans, rating agencies evaluate the impact a predatory 
lending law might have on the availability of funds to pay investors in the rated 
securities.  Id.  
273 See O.C.G.A. §7-6A-1, et seq.; Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory 
Lending Laws: Standard and Poor’s Explains its Approach, 03-4, April 15, 2003.
274 See Standard and Poor’s Press Release, Standard and Poor’s to Disallow 
Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans, Jan. 16, 2003, available at: 
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/016b.pdf; Moody’s Investor Services Press 
Release, Moodys Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential 
Mortgages in Securitizations, Jan. 30, 2003, available at: 
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/0130a.pdf; Fitch Ratings Press Release, Fitch 
Ratins Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS Pools, Considers Impact to Other 
Predatory Lending Legislation; Feb. 5, 2003, 
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/0205b.html.  See also Jonathan Fuerbringer, 
Lending Law in New York Gets Different Interpretations, N.Y. Times at C3 (Mar. 26, 
2003).
275 See Georgia Banker’s Ass’n, GAFLA: The Unintended Consequences, January 
2003, available at http://www.gabankers.com/issuespredatorylending whitepaper.pdf  
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and included a safe harbor provision to protect assignees that 
inadvertently purchase high cost loans.276  As a result, the agencies 
changed course and announced they would rate Georgia residential 
mortgages.277
Similarly, after the enactment of HOSA, S&P announced that it 
would not rate pools that contain certain New Jersey residential loans.  
Specifically, it announced that it would not rate pools that contain the 
following types of loans (“Excluded Loans”): High-Cost Home Loans; 
Covered Home Loans; Home Loans made in connection with home 
improvements (“Home Improvement Loans”); Home Loans made in 
connection with manufactured homes (“Manufactured Housing Loans”); 
and open- and closed-end cash-out refinancing or junior lien mortgage 
loans.278  Purchase money mortgages, on the other hand, will be rated.279
276 Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard and 
Poor’s Explains its Approach, 3- 4, April 15, 2003.
277 S&P announced that it would rate all pools that do not contain high cost loans.  
See Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard and Poor’s 
Explains its Approach, 3- 4, April 15, 2003.  Fitch announced that it would rate all 
residential mortgage pools, including those that contained high cost loans, if they also 
included additional credit enhancements.  See Press Release, Fitch Revises its Rating 
Criteria in the Wake of Predatory Lending Legislation, May 1, 2003, available at: 
www.fitchratings.com. 
278 S&P has excluded cash-out refinancings and junior lien loans “because the 
funds from these loans could be used for the purpose of home improvement (which 
loans carry the potential for assignee liability) and this fact may not be disclosed on 
origination.”  Standard & Poor’s Addresses New Jersey Predatory Lending Law, 
Standard & Poor’s at 3 (May 2, 2003) available at 
http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/03/sp_0502.pdf.  
DOBI has taken the position that cash-out and junior lien mortgage loans are not 
subject to liability under Section 6(b) or 6(c) of the Act “unless a home improvement 
contractor or manufactured home seller made the loan or was otherwise involved as 
specified” in Section 6(a).  DOBI, “lenders should look at a range of factors related to 
an individual borrower’s circumstances.” State of New Jersey Dep’t of Banking and 
Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15, July 25, 2003, at 4.  DOBI argues that the scope of 
Section 6(a) liability is based upon that imposed by the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Holder in Due Course Rule.  The FDC rule requires some degree of involvement by the 
home improvement contractor or manufactured home seller to become applicable to the 
transaction.  Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Guidelines 
on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses 
11,396-11,401 (CCH Consumer Credit Guide) (1976);  See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2.  The 
scope of Section 6 and that of the FTC rule do, indeed, overlap.  And DOBI’s 
interpretation of Section 6(a) is the most compelling.  Nonetheless, it will be left up to 
the courts to decide whether the Legislature intended that that section be interpreted 
similarly to the FTC rule.
DOBI further notes that a lender will know whether a loan is a home improvement loan 
or manufactured home loan because the FTC rule requires that such a loan contains a
prominent provision on the note itself that identifies it as a loan to which some assignee 
liability may be attached.  The provision reads as follows:
NOTICE
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S&P claims that several of the Act’s damages provisions are 
unclear and, therefore may expose assignees to unlimited liability.  
S&P’s position is problematic because it is motivating the lending 
industry in New Jersey to lobby for a significant dilution of HOSA’s 
assignee liability provisions.280  However, many of S&P’s concerns 
appear overstated.  For example, S&P states, without clear explanation, 
that the Act creates unlimited liability for assignees of Covered Home 
Loans.281  However, as previously explained, assignee liability for 
Covered Home Loans is specifically limited by the Act to: (i) suits 
brought in an individual capacity; (ii) within six years; and (iii) for 
damages that cannot exceed the borrower’s remaining obligation under 
the loan plus costs and reasonable attorneys fees.282  Moreover, S&P’s 
refusal to rate Home Improvement Loans and Manufactured Housing 
Loans is inconsistent with its current practice.  As described, the FTC 
has long ago abrogated the application of the holder-in-due course rule to 
such loans and ever since S&P and other rating agencies have 
continuously rated them.  HOSA’s assignee liability provisions add 
nothing to that which previously existed without evident concern to 
S&P.
In any event, another of the rating agencies, Fitch, has concluded 
that, despite some arguable ambiguities in the Act’s damages provisions, 
the risks to assignees are nevertheless low enough that it will continue to 
rate New Jersey mortgage pools that do not contain High Cost Home 
Loans.  In other words, Fitch will, unlike S&P, rate pools that contain 
Home Loans, Covered Home Loans; Home Improvement Loans; and 
Manufactured Housing Loans, but only so long as Fitch receives 
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS 
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE 
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS 
OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH 
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE 
DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE 
DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2.  This requirement, of course, would not protect the assignee 
who purchases from an originator who fails to comply with the FTC rule.
279 Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Addresses New Jersey Predatory 
Lending Law at 2 (May 2, 2003) available at 
http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/03/sp_0502.pdf.  
280 S&P Surprises Lenders; Decision not to rate certain pools cuts new predatory 
law support, Broker, June/July 2003 at 30 (quoting statement of HOSA supporter E. 
Robert Levy, executive director of the Mortgage Bankers Association of New 
Jersey/League of Mortgage Lenders, that “[w]e obviously are not going to be able to 
live with the bill in the present form, unless S&P changes their position).   
281 Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Addresses New Jersey Predatory 
Lending Law at 2 (May 2, 2003) available at 
http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/03/sp_0502.pdf.
282 See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.   
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certification by independent third parties that such pools do not contain 
any High Cost Home Loans.283  Notwithstanding S&P’s position, Fitch’s 
decision to rate all but High Cost Home Loans should provide sufficient 
assurance for the secondary market to continue to finance such loans in 
New Jersey.
It is not surprising that both Fitch and S&P have refused to rate 
mortgage pools containing High Cost Home Loans.  The expected 
consequence of this refusal is that the secondary market will cease 
almost entirely to finance and thereby will dry up the provision of High 
Cost Home Loans in New Jersey.  This effectively renders the assignee 
liability provisions the most powerful in the entire Act.  Because, as 
previously described, a substantial proportion of borrowers that have 
been stuck with High Cost Home Loans could have qualified for better 
mortgage terms, the evaporation of High Cost Home Loans will not 
significantly reduce the availability of credit for subprime borrowers.  
Indeed, such borrowers will likely be offered credit at a lower cost and 
with fairer terms. 
CONCLUSION
In the past decade, predatory lending has become one of the most 
significant threats to the realization of the American dream of home 
ownership for low and moderate-income and African American persons.  
Indeed, one of the primary reasons predatory lending has been so elusive 
and devastating is that it has been difficult to define or regulate.  
Building upon the legislative efforts of the federal government and a 
small number of other states, the New Jersey Home Ownership Security 
Act implements an effective, balanced response that respects the 
complicated dynamic of the subprime residential mortgage market.  
Despite some minor ambiguities, the Act should accomplish much of its 
goal of curbing the worst abuses of predatory lending while preserving 
the availability of credit to all New Jersey consumers who need it.
283 Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Responds to New Jersey Predatory Lending 
Legislation, at 2 (June 5, 2003).
